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This thesis argues that the positive portrayal of the Gulen (Hizmet) movement in the New York 
Times and the Wall Street Journal is a direct result of persistent Orientalism in the American 
academia and news media. The evidence reveals that most of the articles published in the New 
York Times and in the Wall Street Journal Between 1985 and 2016 and the majority of academic 
works completely ignored the controversial nature of the Gulen movement. This favorable 
approach portrays Islam as monolithic and indicates the otherness of Muslims by subjecting them 
to a separate set of standards for “moderation.” This is problematic for two distinct reasons. First, 
it shows that Orientalism is still persistent well into the year 2016. Furthermore, when referring 
to Gulen as “moderate and progressive,” the journalists and academics falsely portray all Muslims 
negatively since this portrayal indicates Gulen’s ideology is moderate in comparison to all 






INTRODUCTION: ORIENTALISM, THE NEWS MEDIA, AND THE GULEN 
MOVEMENT 
 
The negative portrayal of Islam, Muslims and Muslim societies in the news media has 
been a growing issue since the 1970s. Scholars explained this inaccurate and negative portrayal 
with the tumultuous political environment of the 1970s. Oil Embargo, the Islamic Revolution in 
Iran and the Hostage Crisis were among the main events that turned the American attention to 
Islam and eventually to its negative portrayal. The relatively positive atmosphere of the post-
WWII lasted roughly until the end of the Afghan-Soviet War in 1989. While the negative news 
media attention started to portray Muslims and Islam as one-dimensional and almost always as a 
threat to the security of the United States, the collaboration between the United States and the 
Afghan rebels, mujahedeen, continued to garner positive attention. The negative portrayal gained 
momentum with the beginning of the 1990s and eventually reached its peak after the September 
11 attacks with the “War on Terror” and the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Research has repeatedly 
shown that Muslims, Islam, and especially Arabs in the media disproportionally represented as 
violent and uncivilized. Human rights abuses in Muslim majority societies often featured in the 
news for the last twenty-five years; yet, the recent consistent trend in the Muslim-majority 
nations is to better the lives of their members. From Saudi Arabia to Morocco, societies of 
different sects of Islam and minorities started to demand and earn more rights. An examination of 
the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal’s approach to Islam from 1985 to 2016 
demonstrate the persistence of Orientalism. The Orientalist approach employed by both of these 
newspapers emphasized the otherness of Muslims and strengthen the civilized vs. uncivilized 
narrative. During the 1980s there was little to no public interest in Muslim-majority societies but 
the interest grew significantly during the 1990s and reached its peak after the September 11 






violence against women and the lack of LGBTQ+ rights were the main issues both the New York 
Times and the Wall Street Journal persistently reported on; access to healthcare and modern 
education, however, were the kind of issues that often went overlooked. In addition to specific 
issues, a specific person's and a movement's actions were often overlooked as well: Fethullah 
Gulen and the Gulen (Hizmet) movement.1 Even though the Gulen movement’s ideology 
contributes negatively to the most urgent issues in the Islamic world and his ideology contradicts 
the clauses on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both the American academics and 
American journalists insistently portrayed the movement and Fethullah Gulen himself as 
positively. Both the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal dismissed the Turkish concerns 
as if they were coming from some radical faction and referred to the critics of Gulen simply as 
“seculars,” and/or indicated their support of the Turkish Armed Forces, which is an entity that 
enacted several coups over the course of modern Turkey’s history, allegedly to protect the 
secularism principle. The journalists who were somewhat critical of Gulen and the Gulen 
movement lacked in-depth analysis of Gulen’s ideology and primarily focused on the corruption 
allegations of Gulen affiliated charter schools, Gulen’s leadership, and/or the Turkish state’s 
accusation where Gulen was suspected of instructing his followers to infiltrate the state 
institutions. The critical articles never pointed out his remarks where he encouraged violence 
against women –even instructed when and how to beat women. Never pointed out his unscientific 
approach to modern science and especially to the scientific theory of evolution which was 
especially worth noting since he is known for his STEM-oriented schools and famously claims 
that religion and science must be complementary to each other rather than being rivals. None of 
the articles even mentioned Gulen’s deep hatred of the LGBTQ+ individuals and atheists while 
                                               






so vehemently arguing that he promotes tolerance. I argue that the journalists’ reluctance to point 
out these issues can be explained by two interrelated factors. First of all, there is an absolute 
favoritism of Gulen and the Gulen movement in the American academia. American academics 
completely ignored the characteristics of Gulen’s ideology that would never be accepted in a 
Western and Judeo-Christian movement/ideology and portrayed Gulen and his movement as the 
egalitarian and progressive future of Islam. Secondly, I argue that Orientalism, as defined by 
Edward Said in 1979, still dominates Western journalism. While, after 9/11 the journalists’ 
approach seemed to be changed and became more nuanced towards the Muslims, Muslim 
societies, and Islam the evidence that is provided in this thesis demonstrates that this change was 
extremely small in scale. This thesis aims to demonstrate the persistence of Orientalism in the 
U.S. news media, specifically in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal, and the 
absolute favoritism of the American academia of Gulen and the Gulen movement caused the 
false-representation of Gulen and the Gulen movement.  
The majority of the previous research on the portrayal of Islam and/or Muslims focused 
on the negative portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the news media. Unlike the previous research, 
this thesis examines Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement’s portrayal in the news media by 
asking the question “Why does the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal portray Fethullah 
Gulen and the Gulen movement positively?” I argue that in addition to the approaches employed 
by the journalists, the academia’s approach is equally important in order to accurately portray a 
foreign group such as the Gulen movement. The Gulen (Hizmet/Service) Movement is a 
religiopolitical movement that originated in Turkey in the 1960s and became internationally 
known after it reached financial independence during the late 1980s and early 1990s.2 Despite the 
                                               
2 Tugrul Keskin, "Market Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,” in Secular State and Religious Society: Two Forces in 






positive attention attracted from politicians, scholars, and journalists the Gulen movement is 
surrounded by controversy. The movement was alleged to have three to six million followers and 
own the largest network of charter schools in the United States with more than a hundred and 
sixty schools.3 The Movement established more than a thousand schools worldwide as of 2015.4  
One of the most praised aspects of the movement is their STEM-oriented secular schools. 
Gulenists claim that science and Islam can co-exist and that they teach these principles in their 
schools. Yet, the movement’s schools attracted some criticism due to their allegedly corrupt H-
B1 visa policies that allegedly take place in some schools to bring Gulenist teachers to the U.S. 5 
The H-B1 practices of the schools posed an issue for the U.S. labor force since these schools 
outsourced their teachers from Turkey. Recently, Los Angeles terminated three allegedly 
Gulenist charter schools based on fraudulent H-B1 practices.6  
Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement dealt, and are still, dealing with more serious 
accusations. In 1999 the Turkish government accused Gulen of posing a threat to the secular 
Turkish state. This accusation was made after a leaked footage of Gulen showed him giving 
                                               
3 Claire Berlinski, "Who Is Fethullah Gulen?," City Journal, Autumn, 2012, accessed March 28, 2017, 
https://www.city-journal.org/html/who-fethullah-g%C3%BClen-13504.html ; “Largest Charter Network in U.S.: 
Schools Tied to Turkey,” Washington Post, March 27, 2012, accessed March 31, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/largest-charter-network-in-us-schools-tied-to-
turkey/2012/03/23/gIQAoaFzcS_blog.html. 
4 Fethullah Gulen, “Fethullah Gulen: Turkey’s Eroding Democracy,” The New York Times, February 3, 2015, 
accessed September 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/04/opinion/fethullah-Gulen-turkeys-eroding-
democracy.html . 
5 Valerie Strauss, “Turkey Seeks Probes of American Charter Schools It Says Are Linked to Fethullah Gulen,” 
Washington Post, July 20, 2016, accessed March 27, 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answersheet/wp/2016/07/20/turkey-seeks-probes-of-american-charter-
schools-it-says-are-linked-to-fethullah-Gulen/.; “U.S. Charter Schools Tied to Powerful Turkish Imam,” CBS 
News, May 13, 2012, accessed March 27, 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-charter-schools-tied-to-
powerful-turkish-imam/. 
6 Howard Blume, “L.A. Unified Decides Fate of Six Charter Schools; El Camino Leader Resigns,” Los Angeles 








directions to his followers on how to infiltrate the state institutions.7 Since these accusations, 
Gulen has been living in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania.8 Gulen was later acquitted from the 
charges against him in 2006 during Erdogan’s administration before Erdogan and the Movement 
have fallen out.9 More recently, the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, accused 
Fethullah Gulen and the movement for the failed coup attempt of 2016.10 These accusations were 
publicly denied by Gulen in both cases.11  
The Gulen Movement was named after its founder Fethullah Gulen, who was born in 
Erzurum in 1938 and employs Sunni religious figure Said Nursi's ideas.12 Gulen's writings, 
according to his followers, promote the idea that modernity and tradition can co-exist along with 
Islam and modern science.13 The Gulen Movement started to flourish when Gulen moved to 
Izmir, an Aegean city in Western Turkey during the early 1960s, after teaching at a mosque in 
Edirne. During this time, his movement became known as Izmir Community, which later evolved 
into the Gulen/Hizmet (service) movement during the 1960s and 70s.14 Gulen started to invest in 
education in Izmir where he emphasized that Islamic values, STEM, and philosophy could co-
                                               
7 Ibid, 43.; Zia Weise, “Who Is Fethullah Gulen, the Exiled Cleric Blamed for Coup Attempt in Turkey?,” 
Telegraph, 18 July 2016, accessed September 4, 2018, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/18/who-is-
fethullah-Gulen-the-exiled-cleric-blamed-for-coup-attempt. 
8 Ibid. 
9 “Fethullah Gulen Beraat Etti,” CNN Türk, May 5, 2006, accessed March 31, 2017,  
 http://www.cnnturk.com/2006/turkiye/05/05/fethullah.Gulen.beraat.etti/178267.0/index.html. 
10 Peter Beaumont, “Fethullah Gulen: Who Is the Man Turkey’s President Blames for Coup Attempt?,” Guardian, 
July 16, 2016, accessed September 4, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/16/fethullah-Gulen-
who-is-the-man-blamed-by-turkeys-president-for-coup-attempt. 
11 Stephanie Saul, “An Exiled Cleric Denies Playing a Leading Role in Coup Attempt,” The New York Times, July 
16, 2016, accessed September 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/17/us/fethullah-Gulen-turkey-coup-
attempt.html.; “Fethullah Gulen: A Life Dedicated to Peace and Humanity - Answers by Fethullah Gulen,” 
FGulen.com, September 24, 2001, accessed September 4, 2018, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070928001044/http://en.fGulen.com/content/view/973/14/. 
12 M. Hakan Yavuz and John L Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement (Syracuse, 
N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 19. 
13 Ibid, 20. 
14 Bulent Aras and Omer Caha, “Fethullah Gulen and His Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’ Movement,” Rubin Center, 
accessed March 5, 2017, http://www.rubincenter.org/2000/12/aras-and-caha-2000-12-04/.; Keskin, "Market 







exist. Gulen explained how science and Islam could co-exist by stating that God works through 
science: 
[…] God manifests His Names through veils, although His absolute Unity demands that 
we attribute the effects directly to His causes to veil His acts, so that people not ascribe 
Him the things and events that seem unacceptable to them.15 
 
This quote was further explained by Ahmet T. Kuru in “Search for a Middle Way,” as “[…] one 
may attribute a death, for example, to a material cause (e.g., an illness), to the Angel of Death, 
and directly to God, simultaneously and without any contradiction.”16 When Gulen and the 
movement claimed the co-existent nature of philosophy and Islam, they did not specify the kind 
of philosophy they referred to. Gulen affiliated education institutions attracted children of 
economically underprivileged families from rural and more conservative parts of Turkey to create 
the Golden Generation (Altin Nesil) who would get into the best Turkish universities and hold 
jobs in the government bureaucracy.17  
The Turkish state came to regard Gulen and the Gulen movement as anti-communist and 
anti-left wing force with the growing concerns of the Soviet expansionism during the early years 
of the Cold War.18 Gulen was always sympathetic to the anti-communism struggle and played a 
role in the founding of Turkiye Komunizmle Mucadale Dernekleri (Turkish Association for 
Struggle Against Communism).19 The Gulen Movement became the biggest pro-NATO and pro-
American religious group in Turkey.20 When Prime Minister Turgut Ozal came into power in 
1983, after the Coup D’état of 1980, Fethullah Gulen worked with Ozal to promote his ideology 
                                               
15 Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 121. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Keskin, "Market Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,” 127-128. 
18 Ibid, 22. 
19 Lâtif Erdoḡan, Fethullah Gulen Hocaefendi: küçük dünyam (İstanbul: AD Yayıncılık, 1997), 78.; Yavuz and 
Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 22. 







on a broader scale.21 During this time Gulen’s education campaign became nationalized and later 
internationalized.22 To bolster his new Turkish identity where Ottoman legacy, Islam, modernity, 
and the free-market economy came together, Gulen worked with Ozal and became close with 
state institutions.23 The 1980s were also the time where Gulenists established successful 
businesses, financial institutions, and a media empire.24  
As I mentioned above, Gulen’s ideology is essentially hostile to women, non-
believers/atheists, LGBTQ+ individuals, and modern science. Gulen’s ideology contributes 
negatively to the most urgent issues Muslims and Muslim societies suffer continuously because 
of economic hardship, systematic corruption, misinterpretation of religion and for other various 
reasons. Gender and sexual orientation-based discrimination are among the most urgent issues 
the Muslim societies need to overcome. Infidelity, premarital sex, flirting, or any contact with the 
opposite sex can be the reason for violence against children, LGBTQ+ community, and women 
under the name of “honor killings.” While honor killings are not limited to the Muslim world, 
and with the exception of Iran, none of the North African or the Middle Eastern country have 
“honor laws” derived from Islam, the numbers of women who were killed as a result of honor-
based violence were relatively high in the region of the Middle East.25 Feminist scholar Phyllis 
Chesler stated that even if an honor killing was persecuted in a Muslim country the perpetrators 
usually got relatively lighter sentences in her article “Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings.”26 
                                               
21 Ibid, 35.; Keskin, "Market Oriented Post-Islamism in Turkey,” 129. 
22 Yavuz and Esposito, Turkish Islam and the Secular State, 37-38. 
23 Ibid, 35-36. 
24 Ibid, 36. 
 
25 “Honour Killings By Region,” Honor Based Violence Awareness Network, accessed February 5, 2018, http://hbv-
awareness.com/regions/. 
26 Phyllis Chesler, “Worldwide Trends in Honor Killings,” Middle East Quarterly, March 1, 2010, accessed  







According to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Bangladesh, Great Britain, 
Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, India, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Pakistan, Morocco, Sweden, Turkey, and 
Uganda are among the countries where honor killings take place.27 The Express Tribune, one of 
the major English language newspapers in Pakistan, reported that a man murdered his wife based 
on a dream he had where she was cheating on him. The same outlet reported another murder of a 
woman by her husband as a result of a love song dedicated to her through the radio, the husband 
slit the woman’s throat in the town square.28 Child marriage is also rampant in Muslim majority 
countries. 32% of Yemeni girls were married before the age of 18; the number was 19% in 
Palestine, 17% in Egypt and Iraq.29 A Yemeni child, who was only 8, suffered from internal 
injuries on her “wedding night” after marrying a 40-year-old man, the Guardian reported in 
2013.30 A similar incident took place in 2010 when a 12-year-old child was killed as a result of 
her injuries as reported by CNN.31 In 2010, Fox News reported that another Yemeni girl, who 
was 13, died as a result of marital rape; “legislation to ban child brides has been stalled by 
opposition from religious leaders,” the report continued.32 
According to the Pew Research Center, when asked if society should accept 
homosexuality 94% of Tunisians, 97% of Jordanians, 78% of Turks, and 98% of Nigerians 
                                               
27 “Impunity for domestic violence, ‘honour killings’ cannot continue – UN official,” UN News, accessed February 5, 
2018, 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33971&Cr=violence+against+women&Cr1#.WnggSJP1VA. 
28 “Pakistan among Least Tolerant of Homosexuality Globally: Survey,” Express Tribune, June 14, 2013, 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/563152/pakistan-among-least-tolerant-of-homosexuality-globally-survey/ 
29 “Child Marriage in the Middle East and North Africa,” PRB, accessed December 8, 2017, 
 http://www.prb.org/Publications/Articles/2010/menachildmarriage.aspx. 
30 Janise Elise, “Yemeni Child Bride, Eight, ‘Dies on Wedding Night,’” Guardian, September 11, 2013, accessed 
September 4, 2018,  http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/11/yemen-child-bridedies-
wedding. 
31 Mohammed Jamjoom, “Yemeni Child Bride Dies of Internal Bleeding,” CNN World, April 9, 2010,  
 accessed February 5, 2018, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/04/09/yemen.child.bride.death/index.html. 
32 “Dead Yemeni Child Bride Tied up, Raped, Says Mom,” Fox News World, April 10, 2010, accessed  








answered negatively. In comparison, 88% of Spaniards, 87% of Germans, 74% of Argentinians, 
60% of Americans answered “yes.”33 Only 43%, 55%, and 50% of Middle Easterners answered 
positively when asked if “People can say what they want?” “Media can report the news?” and 
“People can use the internet?” Whereas the numbers were as high as 71%, 67% and 69% in the 
U.S.34 According to a Tunis-based organization, Arab League Educational Cultural and Scientific 
Organisation (ALECSO), 46.5% of women in the region were illiterate.35 When asked if women 
should decide to wear the hijab Only 30% answered the question positively in Afghanistan, 45% 
in Jordan, and 30% in Congo.36 The law mandates that women must cover their hair and wear 
unfitting clothes in Iran and Saudi Arabia. Dr. Salman Hameed, who teaches astronomy and 
religion at Hampshire College, stated that “In Turkey, one of the more secular Muslim countries, 
the [acceptance level of evolution] is between 22 and 25%.”37 The acceptance rate of evolution is 
40% in the US.38 The percentage of people who identified themselves as “evolutionists” was 68 
in Sweden and 65 in Germany.39 
Despite these issues and human rights abuses in Muslim societies, American journalists 
who write for the two biggest news outlets in the United States by circulation, the New York 
Times and the Wall Street Journal, promoted a movement that either supports or do nothing to 
                                               
33 “The Global Divide on Homosexuality,” Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project, June 4, 2013, accessed 
September, 2018, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/06/04/the-global-divide-on-homosexuality/. 
34 Alex Gray, “Freedom of Speech: Which Country Has the Most?,” World Economic Forum, November 8, 2016, 
accessed December 8, 2017, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/11/freedom-of-speech-country-comparison/. 
35 “Illiteracy Plagues Arab World,” ArabianBusiness.com, January 8, 2008, accessed December 8, 2017,  
 http://www.arabianbusiness.com/illiteracy-plagues-arab-world-193646.html. 
36 “Dress Code - Women in Islam and Muslim Realms” LibGuides at Cornell University, accessed December 8, 
2017, http://guides.library.cornell.edu/c.php?g=221770&p=2559149. 
37 Ewen Callaway, “How to Stop Creationism Gaining a Hold in Islam,” New Scientist, December 11, 2008, accessed 
December 8, 2017, https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16258-how-to-stop-creationism-gaining-a-hold-in-
islam/. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Glenn Branch, “Polling Creationism and Evolution around the World,” National Center for Science Education, 







eliminate these issues, as the new and moderate face of Islam. Academics and journalists often 
portrayed the Gulen movement as a moderate movement that promoted modern science 
education, women’s rights and tolerance even though the Gulen movement’s objectives would 
contribute to the human rights abuses in the Muslim societies instead of eliminating them as 
suggested by the academics and the journalists.  
The Gulen movement is not unique for attracting an positive interest from the 
journalists, during the height of the Cold War the United States portrayed other fundamentalist 
groups or governments as “friends,” or “freedom fighters.” After World War II, Islam was seen 
as a unifying force against Communism by America and during the Soviet-Afghan war, millions 
of dollars were poured to the Afghan mujahideen, who later evolved into Taliban.40 The 
Orientalist historian Maxime Rodinson stated that "Western Christendom perceived the Muslim 
world as a menace long before it began to be seen as a real problem.”41 Albert Hourani stated that 
the Christian Western world perceived Islam as a false religion and believed that "Islam was 
invented by men whose motives and character deplored and propagated by the sword.”42 The 
world witnessed the shift of political power from the old world to the new world with the end of 
World War II. This was branded and polished with the Cold War Era, which has seen the race 
between the U.S. and the USSR from space research to developing nuclear arms. During the Cold 
War Era (1947 – 1991), intellectual migration to the U.S. became a trend. As a result of all these 
developments, the Orientalist European view of Islam has found itself a new nest in the U.S. 
                                               
40 Neamatollah Nojumi. The Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan: Mass Mobilization, Civil War, and the Future of the 
Region (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009), 119-120. 
41 Maxime Rodinson, Europe and the Mystique of Islam (New York, NY: I.B Tauris, 2002), 3. 
42 Fawaz A. Gerges, “Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political 







universities.43 The mythical, monolithic, and homogenous Islam turned the American 
policymakers to Islam as an official anti-communist tool. The Eisenhower administration hoped 
that King Sa’ud ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia could be a unifying force among Muslims 
against the communist threat.44 During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, America sided 
with a possible Islamic alliance that would serve their interests rather than increased Arab 
nationalism.45 With the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the U.S. became even more involved 
with the region and with Islam. The Carter administration’s National Security Adviser Zbigniew 
Brzezinski hoped to employ Islam as a unifying force against the Soviets as well and unleashed a 
series of propaganda aimed to the Muslims in the USSR.46 According to Gil Guerrero’s 
“Propaganda Broadcasts and Cold War Politics: The Carter Administration’s Outreach to Islam,” 
the State Department-sponsored scholars “to give an impartial academic assessment that 
concurred with the goals of the public diplomacy campaign.”47 Guerrero noted that journalist 
Robert Dreyfuss explained how the U.S. unleashed radical Islam to further its interests in the 
region in his book Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash Fundamentalist 
Islam.48 
The 1970s was the decade Islam and Muslims became to be perceived as a threat by 
Americans. Fawaz Gerges argued that the American perception of the Middle East changed 
during the 1970s as a result of the powerful emergence of political Islam.49 He listed the 1973 
                                               
43 Robert M. Morrisson, “Faith Fights Communism: The United States And Islam in Saudi Arabia During Cold 
War,” (Master’s thesis, University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2009). 
44 Ibid.  
45 Gerges, “Islam and Muslims in the Mind of America,” 75.  
46 Javier Gil Guerrero, “Propaganda Broadcasts and Cold War Politics: The Carter Administration’s Outreach to 
Islam,” Journal of Cold War Studies 19, no: 1, (2017): 6, accessed September 4, 2018. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1162/JCWS_a_00716.   
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 







Arab-Israeli War, Arab Oil Embargo, and the 1978/9 Iranian Revolution along with the hostage 
crisis as the causes of the shift in perception. As a result of these events, many American officials 
started to perceive Islam as a threat to “Western interests.”50 Edward Said also argued that the Oil 
Embargo and the hostage crisis played major roles in this perception in Covering Islam. Said 
stated that this half ideological half fictional label was solidified with the coverage of the Iranian 
Hostage crisis, where Iran and thus Islam became synonymous with religious radicalism and 
terrorism.51 Melani McAlister stated that “Islam’ became highlighted as the dominant signifier of 
the [Middle East], rather than oil wealth, Arabs, or Christian Holy Lands.”52 Gerges also argued 
that Muammar Qaddafi’s employment of Islam in order to legitimize his rule played a major role 
in shifting American perception even long before the Iranian revolution.53 According to Gerges, 
terrorism was another major reason why the American perception of Islam shifted radically. With 
the ending of the Cold War and starting with the 1990s the terrorist attacks that targeted 
Americans contributed to the negative perception of Islam and Muslims even further.54 Richard 
Bulliet, a scholar from the Columbia University, stated that the Americans were becoming to 
identify Muslims with terrorism and started to see Muslims as a part of a culture “that cannot be 
tolerated or reasoned with.”55  
Representations and portrayals of Muslims and Islam changed accordingly. After the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, an International Herald Tribune article stated that even though 
this particular attack was done by an American, most terrorist attacks targeting Americans were 
                                               
50 Ibid. 
51 Edward W. Said, Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World 
(New York: Vintage Book, March 1997), 77. 
52 Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945 (California: 
University of California Press, 2001), 200. 
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perpetrated by Middle Easterners.56 Gerges stated that this argument was not factual and that 
there had been more terrorist attacks against the American citizens by non-Muslims in the last ten 
years.57 Abdulaziz Atiyah Al-Zahrani’s unpublished dissertation “U.S. television and press 
coverage of Islam and Muslims,” established that most stories in the American media regarding 
Muslims were about crises and the general portrayal of Muslims, as a result, were negative.58 The 
article “Press Treatment of Islam: What Kind of Picture Do the Media Paint?” noted that the 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt portrayed negatively and contradictorily since he was 
likened to Hitler and referred to as a “crypto-communist” at the same time.59 Matthew F. Jacobs 
was in agreement and stated that during the early Cold War, the U.S. policymakers, academics, 
and journalists often had contradictory understandings of Islam.60 Kashif Z. Sheikh, Vincent 
Price, and Hayg Oshagan suggested that both Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein were 
portrayed as inhuman and labeled as “mad dogs” in “Press Treatment of Islam: What Kind of 
Picture Do the Media Paint .”61 The article also explained the negative attitude against Islam with 
cultural and linguistic ignorance of the reporters.62 Since the West had similar interests in the 
Muslim world, they influenced their reporters “to use preferred frames when reporting on issues 
in the area. This helps create more favorable public opinion locally and increased political capital 
for policy initiatives internationally.”63 The authors concluded that “Particular international 
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events, depending on whether they are viewed positively or negatively, will determine the tone of 
news stories about Muslims.”64 Deepa Kumar pointed out the lack of studies on the positive 
portrayal of Islam in the media, even though Islam was promoted by the United States during the 
Cold War.65  Kumar concluded that “When ‘Islamic unity’ was useful in the prosecution of the 
Cold War, the news media covered it positively, in contrast to the current period in which a 
transnational Islamist network is presented as an existential threat.”66 Kumar furthered his 
argument by stating that when Islam “is in service to US foreign policy objectives was the ‘right 
kind of Islam.”67   
For example, when the U.S. was aiding the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War, 
the war crimes committed by the mujahedeen were not reported often by the New York Times and 
the Wall Street Journal. David Binder from the New York Times referred to the mujahedeen as 
“anti-communist rebels” in “U.S. Aides Say Afghanistan Army is Crumbling Under Rebel 
Pressure.”68 While the article positively portrayed the mujahedeen by referring them as “anti-
communists,” it also stated that the tribal insurgency especially got stronger after the Soviet-
backed literacy campaign was popular among women, and this caused “Strong antagonism 
among the tradition-minded, male-oriented Afghans.”69 In contrast, Terence Smiths’s article from 
the New York times also referred to the mujahedeen as rebels but did not provide any context of 
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their insurgency.70 Leslie Gelb also chose to refer to the mujahedeen as “guerillas” or 
“insurgency,” without mentioning their Islamic roots.71 Another Gelb article from 1984, while 
reported the $625 million aid went to the mujahedeen, did not mention the motives of the 
rebels.72 Richard Halloran reported in 1986 that there was a possibility of Reagan government 
extending the diplomatic recognition of the mujahedeen, also did not touch upon the radical 
nature of the group.73 Elaine Sciolino’s article reported that the Bush administration was going to 
continue to fund Afghan rebels in 1989 and referred to the mujahedeen as “rebels.”74 This 
positive sentiment changed with the nearing of the end of the war. John F. Burns’ article, that was 
published in 1989, dealt with one of the guerrilla groups in the seven-member rebel coalition in 
Afghanistan. It was reported that after a series of criticism directed to the Islamic Party’s use of 
weapons, the Bush administration cut the faction from receiving any munitions from America.75 
The article identified the head of the group, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, as a Muslim fundamentalist 
and noted that he described America as an “immoral society,” while “his fighters were receiving 
a third to a half of all American military aid to the Afghan rebels, valued over the years at 
hundreds of millions of dollars.” 76 Burns also pointed out that Hekmatyar visited the U.S. once 
in 1985 but refused to meet President Reagan, in contrast to Sciolino’s article published mere 
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months ago.77 Tim Weiner’s article from 1993 reported that the U.S. would spend $55 million to 
try to get back more than three hundred Stinger antiaircraft missiles that were once provided to 
the mujahedeen by the U.S. Weiner’s article mentioned Hekmatyar, like Burn’s article, and noted 
that he became the prime minister of Afghanistan and that he forged an alliance with Iran.78 
As we are going to see the examples below, this attitude that mainly ignored the threat 
and glossed over the mujahedeen was not much different on the pages of the Wall Street Journal 
either. In “U.S. Is Cautious in Aiding Afghan Rebels,” published in 1984 the mujahedeen was 
only referred as Afghan rebels, and the U.S.’ cautious behavior when supporting the mujahedeen 
was explained by the smaller chance of the mujahedeen stood against the Soviet troops.79 Unlike 
the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal pointed out the inclination of Afghan rebels, even 
though they were currently allies, towards “Moslem fundamentalism,” in 1984.80 However, 
another article from 1984 about financial corruption among the Afghan rebels did not refer to 
Islamic radicalism or fundamentalism at all.81 A 1985 article reported that the mujahedeen visited 
the United Nations, looking for political recognition. The article referred to Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar as “Head of the large Hizbi Islami resistance group and chief spokesman for the 
delegation,” and quoted him when he said, "The Soviet conduct in Afghanistan makes a mockery 
                                               
77 Ibid. 
78 Tim Weiner, “U.S. Increases Fund To Outbid Terrorists For Afghan Missiles,” New York Times, July 24, 1993, 
accessed September 8, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/24/world/us-increases-fund-to-outbid-terrorists-
for-afghan-missiles.html.    
79 "U.S. is Cautious in Aiding Afghan Rebels." Wall Street Journal, Apr 09, 1984, accessed September 8, 2018, 
http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/397861902?accountid=28267 
80 Amos Perlmutter. "Containment Strategy for the Islamic Holy War,” Wall Street Journal, Oct 04, 1984, accessed 
September 8, 2018, http://ezproxy.library.und.edu/login?url=https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.library.und.edu/docview/397905630?accountid=28267 
81 Frederick Kempe. "Corruption Said to Divert U.S. Arms from Afghan Rebels, Leading to Demands that the Aid be 









of the U.N. charter, the Declaration of Human Rights, international law and the norms of 
civilized behavior."82 Claudia Rosett’s article published in 1988, referred to the mujahedeen as 
“mujahideen” and mentioned a Soviet-backed terrorism campaign in Pakistan was aiming to end 
Pakistan’s aid to the mujahedeen. The article did not mention the radical trend inside the 
mujahedeen or Hekmatyar’s anti-Americanism while pointing out that it was the Carter 
administration started the aid and the Reagan administration was continuing it.83 Finally, with the 
shift in the approach by the end of the war in 1989, S. J. Masty referred to the problematic 
aspects of the mujahedeen, the radicalism of Hekmatyar, and the growing Wahhabi influence 
inside the state.84 This shows that U.S. interests have had changed as the mujahideen evolved 
from an ally to a radical political entity. And the rhetoric in both the New York Times and the 
Wall Street Journal changed accordingly. 
As mentioned by David Binder in the New York Times one of the major reasons behind 
the insurgency against the elected Afghan government in Afghanistan was the introduced 
reforms. Peter Marsden explained in The Taliban: war and religion in Afghanistan, that the 
literacy campaign and women and girls’ education especially angered the rural Afghan 
population.85 Valentine M. Moghadam also agreed that the ruling party, People’s Democratic 
Party of Afghanistan, tried to introduce a series of reforms where women’s emancipation was 
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linked to “Modernization, development, and socialism.”86 Moghadam explained that there was a 
strong male backlash to the introduced reforms especially to the ones that declared women free in 
choosing their marriage partners and the abolishing of “brideprice,” where the groom’s family 
was expected to pay a certain sum in order to marry the girl, and the right of women to divorce.87 
Marsden stated that “The anger of population found an appropriate outlet in the unifying call for 
Jihad.”88 Huma Ahmed-Ghosh stated that while the mujahedeen mobilized as a result of a 
perceived Soviet threat against Islam and their cultural values, their victory in Afghanistan 
brought an “unprecedented barbarism” between the years 1992 and 1996 during the Taliban 
regime. According to Ahmed-Ghosh, bodily harm against women such as amputations, femicide, 
and rapes were so common that many young women chose to end their lives in order to avoid 
violence and forced marriages.89 Women’s freedom was severely limited during this time, they 
were not allowed to be outside other than to buy food, they had to be accompanied by a male 
relative, their dress code was strictly limited to burqa and no make-up or “fancy shoes,” they 
were not allowed to go to school or visit male doctors in addition to the widespread practice of 
forced marriages and rape.90 It would be safe to say that during the 1980s these news outlets 
disregarded the mujahedeen’s anti-women stance. 
The news media’s influence over politics and public opinion is a debated subject. While 
there is no direct evidence that policymakers are influenced from the news media, coverage of 
                                               
86 Valentine M. Moghadam, “Nationalist Agendas and Women’s Rights: Conflicts in Afghanistan in the Twentieth 
Century,” in Feminist Nationalism, ed. Lois A. West (New York: Routledge, 1997), 76. 
87 Ibid, 87. 
88 Marsden, The Taliban War and Religion in Afghanistan, 24. 
89 Huma Ahmed-Ghosh, “A history of women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the Future or Yesterdays and 
Tomorrow: Women in Afghanistan,” Journal of International Women’s Studies 4, no: 3 (May, 2003): 7, accessed 










certain issues may serve as interpretation and anticipation tools.91 It is also clear that the news 
media is responsible for creating and/or shaping the public opinion. For example, various 
research has shown that the news media played a major role in influencing foreign aid 
allocations; every New York Times story that covered a disaster raised approximately $1.7 million 
in aid. 92 Perhaps the most famous influence credited to the news media was Judith Miller’s 
articles published in the New York Times before the Iraq War in 2003. Thomas E. Ricks in Fiasco 
argued that the breaking newspaper stories in the New York Times further distorted the already 
fouled intelligence process of the Bush administration before the invasion of Iraq. The Bush 
administration justified the invasion based on their strong belief of Iraq’s possession of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD). Judith Miller, a credible the New York Times journalist, published a 
series of articles that supported the WMD narrative. “U.S. Says Hussein Intensifies Quest For A-
Bomb Parts,” co-authored with Michael Gordon was published on September 8th and claimed that 
only a mushroom cloud would be a more credible evidence than what already exists to prove 
Saddam Hussein was trying to build an atomic bomb.93 Fiasco quoted an unnamed senior 
military officer who argued that "The media has far more effect on intelligence analysis than you 
probably realize."94 Miller traveled to Iraq and followed the search for the WMD conducted by 
the U.S. military, later she reported that the WMD were destroyed by the Iraqi officials and that 
experts had “found sources of radioactive material.”95 The New York Times resisted criticism for 
more than a year until running a review that was somewhat critical of Miller’s reporting.96 Judith 
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Miller’s career, on the other hand, ended at the New York Times after she named her source as 
Lewis Libby, Dick Cheney’s chief of staff and national security advisor.97 In a recent study from 
2017, Jeffrey Bachman accused the New York Times for purposefully reporting misleading 
information about the civilian casualties of drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan ordered by the 
Obama administration. 98 In “The New York Times and Washington Post: Misleading the public 
about US drone strikes,” Bachman also argued that this misleading behavior resulted in a lack of 
understanding of the consequences of the drone strikes among the Americans and a lack of public 
opinion.99 Similarly, Robin Stevens argued that newspaper coverage influence news coverage by 
other media outlets and shape and/or influence public opinion. 100 
While the measurable extent of the news media’s influence over policymakers and 
public opinion is open to debate, it is clear that the news media plays an important role in both of 
them. This thesis only focuses on the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal since they are 
the largest news outlets in the United States by circulation. The New York Times is considered by 
its readers, and by itself, as the paper of record. 101 The phrase “newspaper of record,” means that 
a newspaper that is considered authoritative and could be used as a historical source based on its 
established attention to detail and in-depth reporting. The phrase originated after the New York 
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Times started to continuously publish an index of subjects that the day’s paper included in 
1913.102 Former the New York Times executive Max Frankel described his newspaper as: 
 It is the “house organ” of the smartest, most talented, and most influential Americans at 
the height of American power. And while its editorial opinions or the views of individual 
columnists and critics can be despised or dismissed, the paper’s daily package of news 
cannot. It frames the intellectual and emotional agenda of serious Americans.103  
 
The Wall Street Journal is the second largest newspaper in the U.S. by circulation after 
the New York Times.104 The Wall Street Journal, while being reputable for its credibility and 
accuracy also argued to reflect American capitalism and to serve the financial elite by Michal 
Soffer and Ari Rimmerman in “Representations of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
employment-related issues in the Wall Street Journal (1990–2008): a feasibility study.” 105 The 
Economist magazine called the Wall Street Journal “The Bible of American conservatism.” 106 
After the Wall Street Journal was acquired by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation, the 
newspaper became less focused on business and increasingly more focused on foreign affairs and 
politics. According to the Pew Research Center’s Project for Excellence in Journalism from 
2011, the Wall Street Journal became competitive with the New York Times.107 In addition to 
being the two largest newspapers by circulation, the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal 
are also significantly distinct from each other being on the different ends of the political 
spectrum. Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro differentiated between the political leanings of 
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the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal by employing text categorization in order to 
determine the political leaning of the newspapers. First, they identified phrases mostly used by 
conservatives and liberals, such as the use of “death tax” by conservatives and “estate tax” by 
liberals, and then examined the language of the newspapers to determine their political 
leanings.108 According to this text categorization, the Wall Street Journal employed more 
conservative phraseology than the New York Times and vice versa. Pew Research Center’s 2010 
survey also demonstrated that the 45% the Wall Street Journal readers identified as conservatives 
whereas 11% of the New York Times readers identified as conservative.109 
 The coverage of Islam in the Western media is a well-studied subject around the world. 
Elizabeth Pool, from Keele University, United Kingdom, argued that mass media played an 
important role in the production of knowledge and that British Muslims were negatively 
portrayed in the British mass media.110 Anna Korteweg from the University of Toronto, Canada, 
argued that Islam had been portrayed as homogenized and a monolithic entity in Canada and 
often negatively.111 In addition to the news media, the Western popular culture also stereotyped 
Muslim. Jack Shaheen focused on the Muslim Arabs’ portrayal in Hollywood and demonstrated 
that the Muslim societies and Muslims were portrayed as uncivilized and as religious fanatics.112 
Evelyn Alsultany examined the positive portrayal of Muslims in popular culture and argued that 
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the “seemingly positive representations of Arabs and Muslims have helped to form a new kind of 
racism,” since they legitimized racist policies and practices. In the post-racial era of the United 
States, argued Alsultany, the other was not portrayed as the evil but as the sympathetic victim.113  
Coming back to the American news media, the most prominent work that dealt with the 
Muslim image in the media was Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How 
We See the Rest of the World, which was written in 1981 by Edward Said. Said stated that 
Muslims were only featured on the mainstream media as “Oil suppliers or as potential 
terrorists.”114 Said also pointed out the difference between the approaches employed by the 
United States and England and France since the United States did not have a colonialist past like 
the other two. Islam only started to become relevant to America after World War II. Because of 
the lack of historical awareness, argued Said, there was no room for a non-ideological look at 
Islam or at the Arab-world that went beyond “pro/anti-American.”115 Said stated that almost 
every American journalist employed a “subliminal consciousness,” that “makes press 
independence subordinate to what are often only implicit expressions of loyalty and patriotism, of 
simple national identification.”116 Said furthered this argument by stating that “The American 
media inevitably collect information on the outside world inside a framework dominated by 
government policy.”117 According to Said the way the press approached the subject matter 
directly correlated with the audience’s expectations:  
 
The obliteration of the methodological consciousness is absolutely coterminous with the 
presence of the market, for news as well as whole clienteles of security-conscious 
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consumers (governments, corporations, foundations): one simply does not ask why one 
does what one does if there is an appreciative, or at least a potentially receptive, 
clientele.118  
 
Said also explained how Islam became a commodity in academia in relation to expectations: 
 
Worse yet, the scholar stops thinking in terms of the region and the people about whom 
studies are being conducted. Islam, if it is “Islam” that is being studied, is not an 
interlocutor but in a sense a commodity. The overall result is a kind of institutional bad 
faith. The scholarly honor and integrity of the field are upheld against critical outsiders, 
scholarly rhetoric is willfully arrogant about denying political partisanship, and scholarly 
self-congratulation fortifies present practices (principally in popular journalism) 
indefinitely.119  
 
Said stated that scholars tended to work on Islamic issues only if there was a public interest and 
this made the scholarship solely focused on American interests. Said stated that little other than 
“good,” and “bad Muslim” stories were covered in the media because anything else was 
considered irrelevant to the United States. 120 Said argued that it was the same for the academic 
community. Anything outside of extremism, terrorism, and violence were little studied in the 
academia when it came to Islam because the non-academic interest was scarce.121  
While Said’s work could be considered outdated since it was written in 1981, more 
recent studies also argued that Orientalism was still the prominent approach to Islam in the 
American media. Saifuddin Ahmed from Johns Hopkins University and Jorg Matthes from the 
University of Vienna argued that there was an anti-Muslim discourse in the Western media and it 
started with the Iranian Revolution of 1979.122 Islamic studies and journalism scholar Karim H. 
Karim stated that after 9/11 Muslims started to occupy the space once occupied by the 
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communists in American minds.123 Karim also pointed out that the word “Islamic” became a 
popular label to describe radical terrorists’ actions by the journalists. Islam became a focal point 
on the news and the many newspapers such as the New York Times, Newsweek, and Time featured 
headlines that connected Islam to terrorism.124 Indian scholar, Smeeta Mishra, also claimed that 
the Washington Post portrayed the Saudi women as oppressed and in need of Western rescue.125 
This argument that the American media extensively covered the “oppressed Muslim women” for 
propaganda purposes had also been scrutinized by Lila Abu-Lughod in Do Muslim Women Need 
Saving?.126 In addition to Abu-Lughod, author Evelyn Alsultany argued that the oppressed 
Muslim women narrative dominated the news after 9/11. Alsultany stated that Muslim women 
who acted as informants of Muslim daily life often dubbed as “moderate Muslims” by the media, 
promoted racism and Orientalism while serving as proof of false inclusiveness and 
multiculturalism. The “good Muslim women” who denounced Islam and embraced Western 
values became feminist heroes according to Alsultany.127  
On a broader scale, Teun A. Van Dijk’s analysis showed that the mainstream news 
media portrayed the minorities as “a problem or a threat, and are portrayed preferably in 
association with crime, violence, conflict, unacceptable cultural differences, or other forms of 
deviance.”128 Saifuddin Ahmed and Jorg Matthes’ meta-analysis of three-hundred and forty-five 
studies demonstrated that Muslims were “negatively framed” and Islam had been portrayed as a 
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violent religion.129 Ahmed and Matthes also argued that mass media’s articulation of “dominant 
social values, ideologies, and developments” lead to minorities’ misrepresentation in the media. 
130 Ahmed and Matthes’ analysis demonstrated that after 9/11, the Western news media started to 
focus on Muslims and Islam and the portrayal was often negative, and similarly, the academic 
studies mainly focused on the negative aspects and emphasized the link between Islam and 
migration, war, conflict, and radicalism.131 Mohammad Samiei’s article “Neo-Orientalism? The 
relationship between the West and Islam in our globalized world” shed light to Ahmed and 
Matthes’ analysis by examining the changes in Orientalist dualism and neo-Orientalism.132 
Samiei agreed with Ahmed and Matthes on how Islam became more mainstream in the West: 
after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and added that the hostage crisis in Tehran and the 
“unresolved Palestinian question” also contributed to the growing interest in Islam.133 Samiei 
gave the example of portraying Islam as a homogenous enemy, and according to this model 
Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the al-Qaeda had little difference between them.134 
Mubarak Altwaiji stated that 9/11 and the following political changes in the world “Contributed 
to the re-evolution of the classic Orient.”135 Altwaiji stated that the binary division that labeled 
Muslims as “them” was employed with the “War on Terror” and the representations of Muslims 
often portrayed as terrorists.136 
A more recent study from 2013 by Fatemah Poorebrahim and Gholam Reza Zarei 
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followed the consensus and argued that Islam was stereotyped and Muslims were negatively 
represented in the Western news media.137 Poorebrahim and Zarei employed a linguistic approach 
to examine the Muslims’ portrayal. Their argument was that the language used in the media did 
not reflect the reality but it created the reality.138 Poorebrahim and Zarei employed Teun A. Van 
Dijk’s argument that “Mental representations are often articulated along ‘US’ versus ‘THEM’ 
dimensions, in which speakers of one group will generally tend to present themselves or their 
own group in positive terms, and other groups in negative terms.”139 The authors’ examination of 
the Western media yielded the following results: 
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Table 1. Orientalist Themes: Total Numbers and Percentages in the Independent, The Herald 
Tribune, the Times, and the New York Times (NYT).140 
 






NYT % of 
total 
Inferiority 1 0 1 0 4.34 
Backwardness 1 2 2 2 15.21 
Irrationality 2 3 4 4 28.26 
Submissiveness 0 0 0 0 0 
Islam as threat 5 4 4 4 36.95 
Christians/Jews v. 
Muslims 
1 1 3 1 13.4 
Strangeness 0 0 0 0 0 
Untrustworthiness 0 0 0 1 2.17 
Total No. of Headlines 10 10 14 12  
 
  










Radical 3 4 3 2 12 
Corruption 1 0 0 1 2 
Fundamentalist/ism 0 0 0 1 1 
Terrorist/ism 2 2 3 2 9 
Barbarity/Violent 2 0 1 1 4 
Extremist/ism, 
Fanaticism/ism 
0 0 1 1 2 
Kill/War 1 0 1 1 3 
Threat/Fear 2 0 3 0 5 
Dead/Death 0 1 0 2 3 
Veil 1 1 1 0 3 
Total 12 6 13 11 44 
 
As demonstrated by Poorebrahim and Zarei’s data, Islam had been portrayed as the other, that 
was often violent and backward in comparison to the Western culture. Poorebrahim and Zarei’s 
findings demonstrated that Said’s arguments were still valid even after more than thirty years. 
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In order to make sense of the news media portrayal of Islam and Muslims and the 
favoritism of the Gulen movement as a progressive reform movement, it is practical to define the 
historical progress of approaches to Islam and Muslims. It would be fair to say that while some 
nuanced approaches were also employed in the news media towards Islam and Muslims when the 
Gulen movement’s portrayal examined it becomes evident that both Orientalism and neo-
Orientalism were employed consistently by the journalists. In this section, I will define and 
explain Orientalism, neo, and self-Orientalism before demonstrating how all three were employed 
in the approaches of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal toward Islam and Muslims. 
In 1978, Edward Said published one of his most famous works that is still considered one of the 
essential texts of post-colonial studies, Orientalism. Said was the first person to formulate an 
analysis of “the relationship between Orientalist constructions of the Orient and Western imperial 
domination of that Orient.”142 After Said’s work garnered attention, and to some degree criticism, 
two other concepts were defined by scholars in the coming years: neo-Orientalism, which is quite 
similar to Orientalism, and self-Orientalism, which usually goes hand in hand with neo-
Orientalism. 
Edward Said’s main argument in Orientalism dealt with the production of knowledge. 
Said argued that the process of producing knowledge about the Orient was not objective or 
accurate; it was simply a result of the Western view of the Orient. Said defined Orientalism as “a 
style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction,” between the East and 
the West.143 In most simple terms, the lens the West sees the geographic area labeled as the 
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Orient was called Orientalism by Said.144 Edward Said stated in Orientalism that “Anyone who 
teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient— and this applies whether the person is an 
anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist— either in its specific or its general aspects, 
is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism.”145 Said argued that there was no 
“Orient” that was misrepresented by the Westerners, and stated that "the Orient" itself was a 
constituted entity, and that “the notion that there were geographical spaces with indigenous, 
radically "different" in-habitants who could be defined on the basis of some religion, culture, or 
racial essence proper to that geographical space was equally a highly debatable idea.”146 In 
Orientalism, Said stated that the group of ideas about the “Orient” had no realness to them. In 
short, he argued that there was no real “Orient.”147 In relation to this argument, he claimed that 
Orientalism did not accurately represent the Orient [since it was impossible because the Orient 
was a constructed reality by the Occident] but it was still “valuable as a sign of European-
Atlantic power over the Orient.”148 Said also stressed the constant status of the Occident in 
relation to Orient in Orientalism.149 Said believed that the inferiority attributed to the Orient by 
the Occident also served to construct the Occident’s superiority.150 Said stated that knowledge 
was produced, and according to this, the Occident represented the civilization while the Orient 
represented the uncivilized; the Occident was the main geographical area while the Orient was 
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the surroundings; the Occident could modernize the Orient and could civilize it.151 Burc Aka and 
Ensar Nisanci argued that the Occident defined the Orient as the surrounding other and as the 
opposite of reason and virtues by putting itself in the center as the civilization.152 Fred Halliday 
defined “Orientalism” as an approach to the Arab world “on some broad premises,” such as 
language, Islam, and the lack of historical change.153 First of them is the language of the region, 
specifically Arabic.154  Halliday argued that once an individual learned Arabic, he or she almost 
immediately qualified to be an expert of the Arab world and even seen as someone who c 
understand the “Arab mind.”155 The second premise, according to Halliday, was religion. Islam 
was seen as an “independent variable, an explanatory factor.”156 Halliday pointed out that issues 
explained in Encyclopedia of Islam as “The lack of entrepreneurial class, the frailty of 
democracy, the hostility to Israel, the insecurity of boundaries, the apparent rejection of 
modernization, the irrationality, cruelty, even terrorism characteristic of Middle East politics are 
related to atemporal ‘Islam’ or, failing that, ‘the Arab Mind.”157 Finally, the third premise, 
Halliday explained, was the lack of change. “[…] The difficulty or impossibility to change, 
particularly when if this is seen to be in a direction more like the liberal, secular and in broad 
terms rational democracies of the West.”158 
While Said referred to the late eighteenth century as the starting point of Orientalism, the 
origins of Orientalism can be traced back to the 14th Century when the Church Council of Vienna 
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ordered university chairs to work collectively to “promote an understanding of oriental trade, 
inter-religious rivalries and military conflict.”159 As Said pointed out, the first detailed studies of 
the Orient were not published until the 18th and 19th centuries.160According to Bryan S. Turner, a 
theology scholar at Birmingham University, the knowledge of Orient was a direct result of 
European expansion towards the East.161 While the “Orient” is a geographical term that 
constitutes the area from the East Mediterranean to Southeast Asia, “Islam,” Turner argued, 
“played a peculiarly significant part in the formation of Western attitudes to the East.”162 Turner 
argued that Orientalizing the Orient reduced it to a series of oversimplifications in order to make 
it easily comprehensible for the Western audience. This trend had been criticized recently on the 
same pages of the Wall Street Journal by Misha Euceph. In 2017, Euceph wrote about a 
prominent stereotype Muslim women faced, head coverings became their sole identity, a sole 
symbol of all Muslim women regardless of their stance on the headscarf. 163 A Muslim woman 
from Queens, New York who wore a headscarf made out of the American flag had recently 
become the face of all Muslim women, especially during the protests against the Trump 
administration.164 Euceph argued that since there was not a homogenous consensus over the 
headscarf’s place in Islam by Muslims and Islamic scholars, it was stereotyping to portray all 
Muslim women in a single way. “People who do not personally know Muslims now associate 
the religion with an article of clothing that is not universally representative,” Euceph remarked in 
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“How Progressives Tokenize Hijab.”165   
Edward Said’s Orientalism attracted its fair share of criticism in addition to great praise. 
Most of the critics of Said’s work revolved around his vagueness when defining the Orient and 
his approach to the Occident. Said mainly focused on the British and French view of the Orient 
and left the rest of the Western world out. He was accused of committing “Orientalism in 
reverse” since he was also overgeneralizing the West based on two former empires.166 Bernard 
Lewis, who is considered a traditional neo-Orientalist, also pointed out that Said reduced the 
Orient to the Middle East and only examined the British and French imperialism along with Fred 
Halliday who also accused Said of representing the West as homogenous.167 Fred Halliday 
focused on another aspect and pointed out the racism employed against the Orient was evident in 
“about all subject peoples,” and the hostility towards Arabs or Muslims were not unique.168 Aijaz 
Ahmad argued that Said could not deliver an answer to the question of whether Orientalism 
misrepresented the Orient or that it was impossible to authentically represent the Orient.169 Said 
stated that the main issue was “Whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or 
whether any and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded first in the 
language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer.”170 Which 
Bruce Robbins responded, “If everything is a representation, then representation is not a scandal. 
Or if all representation is a scandal, then no particular representation is particularly 
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scandalous”171 Overall, none of the critiques of Said argued that Orientalism was not employed 
when defining and explaining the region of the Orient, their criticism mainly dealt with Said’s 
definition of the Occident and with the uniqueness of the Orientalism. None of Said’s critiques 
discredited his claims.  
The Orientalist question whether Islam and the West were compatible had been asked 
repeatedly especially since the 1990s. Bernard Lewis, in his article “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, 
argued that between the Muslims and the West there was “nothing less than a clash of 
civilizations.”172 Samuel Huntington also developed his own argument supporting the idea of the 
clash of civilizations. Ernest Renan said that in order to be understood “Islam […] should be 
reduced to tent and tribe,” Huntington argued that “Islam has bloody borders,” and famously 
Bernard Lewis penned an article entitled “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” that argued all Muslims 
were prone to violence.173 Different interpretations of Islam, cultures, beliefs, and practices in 
addition to secular movements were all ignored in Orientalism.174 Meanwhile, experts such as 
Fred Halliday and John L. Esposito were actively trying to debunk the myths surrounding Islam 
and Muslims.175 Deepa Kumar, in 2010, argued that Islam became the “civilizational antithesis of 
the ‘West.”176 Matthew F. Jacobs argued that Islam was interpreted as “monolithic, totalitarian 
and inherently confrontational” in the early years of the Cold War.177 Salim Kerboua, on the other 
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hand, argued that the original views behind Orientalism resurfaced as intensified after 9/11. 
According to Kerboua, both Bernard Lewis and Samuel Huntington played major roles in 
constructing neo-Orientalism where Muslims were perceived as violent in addition to being 
backward and inferior in comparison to the Westerners.178 Neo-Orientalism was defined similarly 
to its predecessor by Ali Behdad and Juliet Williams, “monolithic, totalizing, reliant on a binary 
logic, and based on an assumption of moral and cultural superiority over the Oriental other.”179 
Behdad and Williams pointed out a significant difference between Orientalism and neo-
Orientalism, while Orientalists tended to be white and European males, neo-Orientalists were 
“rather Middle Eastern women and men who use their native subjectivity and new-found agency 
in the West to render otherwise biased accounts of the region seemly more authoritative and 
objective.”180 According to Behdad and Williams “A journalistic pretense of direct access to truth 
and the real dominates the current form, as neo-Orientalists deploy superficial empirical 
observations about Muslim societies and cultures to make great generalizations about them.”181 
Avadhesh Kumar Singh defined neo-Orientalism as the “discourse about (sic) Orient by the 
people of the Orient located in the West or shuttling between the two.”182 Mubarak Altwaiji 
pointed out that Dag Tuastad employed the term neo-Orientalism when criticizing the American 
“neo-colonial and neo-liberal agenda in the Middle East.”183 When George W. Bush described 
the “War on Terror” as a crusade and when the First Lady, Laura Bush, pointed out that the same 
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war was also “A fight for the rights and dignity of women” the neo-Orientalist approach was 
employed.184  
The main difference between Orientalism and neo-Orientalism is the difference of the 
definition of the Orient. While both of them put the Occident in the center and define the Orient 
over the Occident, in Orientalism the Occident is a geographical concept as in the “East of the 
West.” In neo-Orientalism, the Orient is defined over identities such as Muslim, the Middle East, 
or Islam.185 Neo-Orientalism emphasized that the Orient’s backwardness stems from their culture 
rather the lack of modernization, which is another major difference between Orientalism and neo-
Orientalism. Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, and Robert Kaplan all argued that the 
backwardness of the Muslim world was a direct result of the Islamic culture and the Muslim 
mentality that was essentially prone to violence.186 Yahya Sadowski argued that neo-Orientalists, 
unlike the Orientalists, attributed the backwardness of the Middle East to the tribal Islamic 
mentality that did not accept modern political organizations.187 Another major significant 
characteristic of neo-Orientalism is that it popularizes factually wrong notions about the 
Orient.188 Neo-Orientalism employs the Orient’s own people to define the Orient. This is 
sometimes called self-Orientalism, which was defined as “in a Western value system one’s self-
explaining/representing by corrupting the representation of one’s own culture.”189 Unlike 
Orientalism, where the West is the actor and the East is the acted on, in self-Orientalism, it is the 
Westernized Eastern acting upon the East. In both of these approaches, the Orient is always the 
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object.190 Historically, self-Orientalism first mentioned by Antonio Chuffat Latour in 1927 
referring to the representation of Chinese in “Apunte Histórico de los Chinos en Cuba”191 Unlike 
Said’s argument that Orientalism was between the East and the West, self-Orientalism is solely 
Eastern. The Orient’s elites who employ Western values upon themselves inevitably self-Orient 
their own selves/cultures.192 Both Orientalism and neo-Orientalism essentialized the otherness of 
Islam, and what is now called “new barbarism” by Dag Tuastad was a direct result of these two 
Orientalisms. “New Barbarism,” according to Tuastad, was the way of representing Arabs and 
Muslims in the Western media as if violence originated from their respective cultures while 
omitting political and economic reasons of violence.193 It simply refers to the identification of 
Muslims with violence; it is important for the neo-Orientalist view to emphasize this relation 
between Muslims and violence in order to stress the cultural divide between the West and the 
Orient.194 Overall, it would be fair to say that both Orientalism and neo-Orientalism employed an 
approach to the Occident that portrayed its culture, religion and its people as backward, 
monolithic, uncivilized, and violent. In addition to this portrayal, Islam often cited as the source 
of these negative characteristics of the Orient.  
 The positive portrayal of the Gulen movement in the New York Times and in the Wall 
Street Journal by portraying it as an apolitical and secular modernizing force for Islam, which 
will be examined in detail in Chapter II, stemmed from Orientalism and neo-Orientalism. This 
favoritism of the Gulen movement might have hindered the public opinion and foreign policies 
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employed by the United States. Unlike its favorable portrayal, the Gulen movement is essentially 
a highly political movement, where Gulen ties religion to national identity and civilization. It 
aims to impose a sexist ideology that conforms traditional gender roles and imprisons women to 
the domestic sphere in addition to strengthening the existing prejudices against the already 
vulnerable LGBTQ+ communities in Muslim societies. Gulen movement has been imposing 
outdated and factually wrong scientific knowledge to the public to further strengthen the religious 
identity. In order to understand the positive portrayal of the Gulen movement of the New York 
Times and the Wall Street Journal, it would be best to demonstrate the portrayal of Islam and 
Islam-related news in both of these newspapers. As I mentioned above, the portrayal of Islam and 
Muslim-majority societies had not changed drastically overtime from openly Orientalist, while 
there were cultural relativist/multiculturalist and nuanced approaches to Muslims and Islam the 
majority of the articles in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal still employed the 
characteristics of Orientalism and neo-Orientalism.  
While Islam and Muslim-majority societies were not paid much attention by these 
newspapers during the 1980s, this changed with the new decade of 1990. As a result, the public 
was subjected to more information about Islam and naturally more criticism of the problems that 
were common in Muslim-majority societies. The trend, as demonstrated by the examined articles 
in the following chapter, was that both of the largest newspapers in the United States by 
circulation growingly became more critical of issues in Muslim-majority societies. The evidence 
also suggests that this critical approach had not been applied to Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen 
movement. The evidence demonstrates that regardless of the approach employed by the 
newspaper, the Gulen movement, as a religiopolitical movement with an ideology that often 
contradicts the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, gained a certain favoritism and avoided 






movement had been praised for providing a modern Islam that was compatible with the West and 
the Western values in contrary to the evidence that demonstrates the nationalistic and the 
fundamentalist nature of the movement. In order to paint a clear picture of how Islam, Muslim 
societies, and problems that were common in Muslim- societies were portrayed and criticized in 
the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal, I examined sixty articles that were published 









CHAPTER I: THE PERSISTENCE OF ORIENTALISM IN THE NEW YORK TIMES 
AND IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL BETWEEN 1985 AND 2016  
My examination of the articles that dealt with Muslims and problems often attributed to 
Muslim societies demonstrates that a very prominent Orientalist approach progressively left its 
place to a relatively more nuanced approach that still fits the definition of Orientalism and/or neo-
Orientalism in the case of the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. Since 1985, both of 
the newspapers increasingly provided platforms to journalists from a variety of backgrounds to 
employ their own point of views on matters of Muslim societies and Muslims. Especially the 
New York Times’ journalist pool grew significantly more diverse after 9/11. However, journalists 
with diverse backgrounds did not always mean more balanced or accurate representations of 
Islam and Muslims. As stated above, one of the main characteristics of neo-Orientalism is 
providing non-factual information about the Orient, and self-Orientalism where a member of the 
Orient accept the cultural superiority of the West and misrepresent his or her own culture 
accordingly.195 In the next two sections, I will examine Muslims’ portrayal in the New York 
Times and the Wall Street Journal to demonstrate that the essentially Orientalist approach 
persisted. The evidence also shows that these newspapers had never been reluctant to criticize or 
point out the problems in Muslim societies while mostly sparing the Gulen movement. 
 This section thematically examines the articles published in the New York Times that 
dealt with Islam, Muslims, Muslim minority and Muslim majority societies, starting with Judith 
Miller’s article “Court Ruling on Wives Divides Egypt,” from 1985 until 2016 to demonstrate the 
Orientalist and neo-Orientalist approaches that had been continuously employed by the New York 
Times and the lack of criticism of the Gulen movement. While the journalists became more 
                                               






diversified in time and the tones of articles had changed from a more Western-centric to a less 
polarizing one, the criticism towards the practices often identified with Muslim-majority societies 
such as lack of women’s and LGBTQ+ rights actually became more prominent since 1985. For 
instance, during the 1980s Islam was almost always related to the conflict in the New York Times 
yet some social issues that took place in some Muslim-majority societies attracted attention as 
well. When I searched the New York Times database for words “Islam” and “terrorism” it yielded 
1,205 results for the years between 1985 and 2000 and 3,653 results for the years between 2001 
and 2017.  For example, in 1986, the Iranian Islamic regime was harshly criticized by the New 
York Times. An editorial used the word “barbarous” describing the alleged persecution of the 
Bahai minority by the regime. 196 The emphasis was on the “uncivilized vs. civilized” narrative. It 
is clear that the portrayal had gotten varied over the decades and while Islamic extremism is still 
a topic that gets published often, social lives of both the Muslim minority in the United States and 
the Muslim-majority societies became frequent topics as well. In Do Muslim Women Need 
Saving, Lila Abu-Lughod argued that the Western news media portrayed Muslim women in need 
of Western help.197 Abu-Lughod examined the portrayal of Muslim women before and during the 
invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and argued that the portrayal of Muslim women was 
used to justify the Iraq War in 2003. When I examined thirty-four articles from the New York 
Times that dealt with women’s rights issues in Muslim societies such as child marriage, 
polygyny, and mandatory dress codes it became evident that until as recent as 2016 the 
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journalists employed problematic approaches that fit the definition of Orientalism and/or neo-
Orientalism.  
The first article I examined was Judith Miller’s piece from 1985. This article dealt with 
the then-new court ruling that made it easier for Egyptian men to practice polygyny and the 
reaction it caused among the liberal circles.198 Miller argued that the Egyptians who were afraid 
to be labeled as anti-Islamists claimed that the Quran granted women more rights than Western 
societies.199 Miller’s article tied the issues with gender equality in Egypt directly to the Quran and 
as a result, she cited Islam as the cause for the gender inequality in the Egyptian society without 
exploring any other possible reasons. Miller’s approach is the typical Orientalist approach, where 
Islam is seen as a cause for uncivilized behavior and the reason for this backward practice. 
Miller’s approach strengthens the “us vs. them” thesis by minimizing the social and historical 
causes and scapegoating Islam for all kinds of unequal treatment of women in society. 
Child marriage in Muslim-majority societies was a prominent theme in the 1980s for the 
New York Times. An article from 1987 focused on the widespread practice of child marriage in 
Nigeria, and two articles written by Barbara Crossette focused on the practice of child marriage 
in Pakistan and India.200 All three of these articles pointed out the negative consequences of early 
marriages that were often forced upon the young girls by their families. Crossette pointed out the 
Islamic influence over formerly Hindu Rajasthan, India, indicating that the child brides were a 
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consequence of Islam. James Brookes also stressed that the child bride he was writing about was 
a Muslim and that Nigeria was a Muslim-majority country.201 According to the datum provided 
by the non-governmental organization Girls Not Brides: The Global Partnership to End Child 
Marriage, predominantly Christian Central African Republic was following the predominantly 
Muslim Niger in child marriages.202 According to the same datum, Brazil, Mexico, the U.S., 
Ukraine, Thailand, Bhutan, and Vietnam were the other countries where child marriages took 
place frequently. As suggested by this evidence, portraying Islam as the cause for the issue of 
child marriage is both oversimplifying vastly diverse Muslim societies and enforce the “civilized 
vs. uncivilized” narrative. In twenty-five states in America, there is no minimum age for 
marriage, yet all three of these articles framed the issue as an Islamic problem rather than a 
world-wide and cross-cultural one.203   
Henry Kamm’s article from 1988 about the women’s future in Afghanistan after the 
Soviet-Afghan war aimed to paint an optimistic picture for the Afghan women. For his article, 
Kamm interviewed Masooma Esmatee Wardak, who was the president of the Women’s Council 
of Afghanistan. Wardak emphasized the worries of Afghan women regarding the possibility of 
fundamentalists gaining control and eliminating the women’s rights. When Kamm quoted 
Wardak’s optimistic outlook for the future he also pointed out her year-long education in 
National College of Education in Evanston, Illinois, where she learned most of her English skills 
according to Kamm.204 By pointing out Wardak’s education in the U.S., Kamm indicated her 
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Westernized status. Another article from 1989 written by Barbara Crossette recounted women’s 
struggle for greater rights in Pakistan and pointed out the inferior status of women to men. The 
article especially highlighted an activist woman’s plea for legal help to a woman whose husband 
did not permit her to get a mastectomy even though she had breast cancer.205 While there is no 
way to fact check this claim, the journalist’s decision to include it to her article contributed to the 
“oppressed Muslim woman in need” narrative. Crossette also stated that gender inequality in 
Pakistan derived from economic disadvantages, tribal societies, and from Islam.206 Judith Miller’s 
article from 1992 reported the growingly oppressive practices in Muslim countries. Miller told 
the story of an Algerian businesswoman whose child cousin refused to kiss her goodnight since 
he was told by a teacher that it was haram to kiss women.207 In this article, Miller quoted Gilles 
Kepel, an Orientalist French expert on Islamic extremism:  
What we're seeing is the re-Islamization of the entire region, the alteration of basic 
patterns of life. Europe is not immune. In my neighborhood in Paris, I used to see one 
veiled woman a week. Now I see five a day.208  
 
Miller pointed out the oppression of women by the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, and other 
abuses of women’s rights in Sudan, and Egypt.209 Miller also quoted Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, an 
Egyptian political scientist, who argued that Arabs cannot be democratic since they understood it 
as the ruling of the majority without any concern over minority rights.210 Miller’s article 
employed neo-Orientalist approach and Dessouki’s comments could be considered self-
Orientalism, where the Oriental accepted the Western superiority and misrepresented her/his 
own.  
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Barbara Crossette pointed out the exclusion of women from public life in Afghanistan 
under the Taliban rule where women were forced to quit their jobs at the United Nations. The 
article also pointed out the problems with the girls’ education under the Taliban rule. Crossette 
identified the Taliban as “conservative Islamic councils” in the first line of her article instead of 
pointing out the radical nature of the organization.211 This overgeneralization falsely indicated 
that all conservative Muslims support extremely sexist acts and ideas of Taliban that still targets 
women to this day. A news article from 1995, “Islamic Dress Code Deaths,” reported the murder 
of three women in Turkey. A mother and daughter were slain in the Black Sea region of Turkey 
by their family members allegedly for “dressing revealingly.”212 This brief article labeled the 
motives of the murderers as the “Islamic dress code,” while there is no consensus on the 
supposed “Islamic dress code.”213 Oversimplifying a much-debated subject in a sentence fits the 
definition of the Orientalism as well. Marlise Simon’s article from 1998 focused on the women’s 
rights abuses in Morocco where polygyny was legal and honor-based violence was prevalent 
according to the article. Women’s status was criticized throughout the article and Simon stated 
that “[Polygyny and honor-based violence] are common -- and not just in Morocco, which likes 
to see itself as one of the more cultured and humane lands among Arab nations.”214 Simon’s 
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approach indicated that Morocco was one of the civilized nations in the Arab world and yet still 
could not achieve a Western level civilization while also indicating that other Arab nations were 
less cultured and less humane. Elaine Sciolino wrote in 2000 on the strict Iranian dress code and 
examined the allowed dress colors for young female pupils in schools. According to this article, 
girls who were younger than nine did not have to comply with the dress code in public but must 
so in state-run schools. The article featured an image of a group of female children wearing 
chadors where the subtitle read: “In Tehran, 9-year-olds celebrate their duties as young Islamic 
girls.”215 Sciolino’s approach indicates her Orientalism since she specifically referred to chador 
as “Islamic dress.” Again, there is no consensus on the “Islamic dress code” among Muslims and 
scholars, in the case of Sciolino’s article it was the Iranian government who enforced this dress 
code. 
In 2001, Susan Sachs wrote about women’s status in Muslim majority societies that 
echoed the reports from the previous decade. Sachs’ article, entitled “Islam preaches equality, yet 
in most Muslim countries a woman’s place is determined by a man’s will. It’s the law,” failed to 
recognize that gender inequality was not, and still is not, a direct cause of Islam nor it was unique 
to Muslim societies.216 “For Many Turks, Head Scarf's Return Aids Religion and Democracy” 
published in 2008, written by Sabrina Tavernise and Sebnem Arsu. The article opened with a 
question whether or not lifting the ban on headscarf was eroding secularism in Turkey and then 
continued “But in Turkey, looks are often deceiving. A majority of Turks see the measure — 
submitted Tuesday to Parliament, where it is expected to pass — as good for both religion and 
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democracy.”217 Tavernise and Arsu provided data from a survey where the majority of the 
sampled Turks considered themselves as “very/extremely religious.” Tavernise and Arsu used 
this data to demonstrate that the majority supported the lift of the headscarf ban. Yet, one can be 
extremely religious and not favor the headscarf or vice versa. The portrayal of a debatable topic 
as “good for religion” fits the definition of Orientalism, and neo-Orientalism since Sebnem Arsu 
is Turkish. The journalists overgeneralized the Turks who favored the lift of the headscarf ban 
and the Muslims who identified as religious and in Arsu’s case misrepresented the reality without 
any solid evidence. In an article written on a 9-year-old Yemeni child bride who sought divorce 
in 2008, journalist Robert F. Worth stressed the role of conservative Islam in child marriages 
both in Yemen and Afghanistan.218 As I mentioned above, child marriages cannot be considered 
unique to Muslim societies, and Islam could not be considered the cause for them since there are 
many Muslim societies that do not practice child marriage. 
A 2016 op-ed “How Islam Can Fight the Patriarchy” by Riada Asimovic Akyol credited 
Islamist women of Turkey for the withdrawal of a bill known as the “child rape bill,” that was 
aimed to retrospectively pardon any statutory rapist of a female victim if the perpetrator agreed to 
marry the victim.219 Asimovic Akyol stated that the bill was withdrawn because of the outrage it 
caused among the Islamist women.220 Asimovic Akyol’s claim about the reason for the 
withdrawal of the bill portrayed the protesters’ position as “progressive.” Yet, the bill was only 
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proposed and the Turkish Civil Law states that no one could marry, under no circumstances, 
before the age of sixteen, and the normal minimum marriage age is seventeen.221 Since the 
protesters were supporting the law should be preserved as it was, it would be impossible to talk 
about a progressive position. Asimovic Akyol stated that using “Islamic arguments” may be 
helpful to stop child marriages justified based on Islam around the world. Asimovic Akyol’s 
opinion piece indicated that child marriages were a problem unique to Muslim societies. Hence 
this article could be considered Orientalist and even self-Orientalist for misrepresenting the 
position of the law-makers and the protestors while overgeneralizing the protestors’ identity as 
“Islamic.” Diaa Hadid, an observant Muslim journalist, recounted her own experience in “At the 
Hajj, Facing Islam's Inconsistent Embrace of Women” that was published in 2016. While she did 
not mention the spiritual side of her journey, her article focused on the second-class status of 
women in Saudi Arabia that all Muslim women had to endure if they wanted to practice 
pilgrimage to the Muslim holy land Mecca.222 Hadid’s article stood out from the majority of 
articles that are examined here since she provided her own experiences in a non-secular country. 
Hadid’s article was a great example of self-Orientalism; she attributed the Saudi Arabian dress 
code to Islam by stating that “[She] was at once frustrated by Islam’s nitpicky strictures on 
women’s dress.”223 
Hostility toward the LGBTQ+ communities in the Muslim and Muslim-majority 
societies and communities also attracted some attention by the New York Times. Since Fethullah 
Gulen and the Gulen movement are both hostile to the LGBTQ+ community it was striking to 
                                               
221 “124 No’lu madde,” Turk Medeni Kanunu, accessed September 8, 2018, 
http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/1.5.4721.pdf.  
222 Diaa Hadid, “At the Hajj, Facing Islam’s Inconsistent Embrace of Women.” New York Times, September 15, 








find articles that emphasized “Islam’s hostility” towards the LGBTQ+ communities while none 
of the New York Times articles pointed out Gulen’s homophobia. Susan Sachs penned an article 
in 1999 and explained the spiritual and personal struggles of young Muslim gay men in the 
United States. The young gay activists pointed out that it was impossible for them to convince a 
Muslim community leader, imam or a political leader to speak at their events while Sachs 
stressed the fact that homosexuality was illegal in most of the Muslim-majority countries. While 
this is correct, there are also Muslim-majority countries such as Jordan and Turkey where 
homosexuality is legal, and discrimination based on sexual orientation is outlawed.224 Sachs’ 
approach could be considered Orientalist since she overgeneralized Muslims for being hostile to 
the LGBTQ+ communities and cited Islam as the reason for this hatred. Robert F. Worth wrote 
about the challenges the Muslim LGBTQ+ individuals faced in 2002. Worth pointed out that in 
most Islamic societies homosexuality was a crime “punishable in some cases by death.”225 
Worth’s report was accurate, yet it also pointed out that Al-Fatiha, a Muslim LGBTQ+ group 
founded by gay Muslims, and an unnamed imam from a liberal New York City Mosque did not 
consider homosexuality as a sin. This proves that hostility against the LGBTQ+ community 
cannot be considered a direct result of religion. Worth’s approach fits the definition of 
Orientalism since he portrayed Islam as a monolithic religion as his article suggested that the 
hostility towards the LGBTQ+ community was also monolithic. A Neil MacFarquhar article 
“Gay Muslims Find Freedom, of a Sort, in the U.S.” quoted a gay Muslim man:  
They're afraid of the rest of the community here,'' said Ayman, a stocky 31-
year-old from Jordan, who won asylum in the United States last year on the 
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basis of his sexuality. ''It's such a big wrong in the Koran that it is impossible to 
be accepted.226  
 
Again, since this article portrayed Islam as the sole reason for the hostility against the LGBTQ+ 
communities it committed Orientalism and even self-Orientalism. As other articles that were 
published in the New York Times reported, there were and still are Muslim LGBTQ+ 
organizations. It would simply be committing Orientalism to overgeneralize almost two-billion 
people from different cultures with different point of views. 
Similar to the LGBTQ+ issues, creationism was another current issue the New York 
Times paid attention in the recent years that is a non-issue when it comes to the Gulen movement. 
While the Gulen movement claims that they support modern scientific education in their schools, 
Fethullah Gulen wrote materials aimed to discredit the theory of evolution and he repeatedly 
stated that he did not believe in evolution. In 2007, Cornelia Dean wrote about Harun Yahya and 
his controversial self-published book Atlas of Creation in the New York Times. Dean interviewed 
a group of scholars who received the book in the mail unsolicited and the article concluded that 
Yahya’s book mostly consisted of unscientific claims.227 Kenneth Chang reported that 
creationism was common among Muslims and it was a worrisome trend since it indicated a slow 
scientific progress in these communities or nations in “Creationism, Minus a Young Earth, 
Emerges in the Islamic World” written in 2009.228 Both Dean’s and Chang’s articles 
demonstrated the double standards applied to the Gulen movement.  
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 It would be unfair to leave out the examples of articles where the journalists approached 
their subject matters without employing the characteristics of Orientalism. The sample of 
articles here also demonstrated that even though the New York Times employed non-Orientalist 
approaches to the issues of Muslims and Muslim-majority societies, they also did not publish 
articles that pointed out the same issues with the Gulen movement and Fethullah Gulen. Seth 
Mydans’ article from 1996, stated that the Malaysian women’s rights activists attributed the 
inequality of women to men rather than Islam while the article recognized the secondary status 
of women in Malaysia.229 Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement’s support of gender 
inequality was, on the contrary, misrepresented in the New York Times.230 None of the articles 
that were published in the New York Times referenced to Fethullah Gulen’s article where he 
instructed his followers on the particulars of physically assaulting their wives.231 Neil 
MacFarquhar’s article from 2001 about an Egyptian trial, where fifty-two men were tried for 
suspicion of homosexual activity, pointed out that while homosexuality was not illegal in Egypt 
the justice system was corrupt enough to try people based on charges that did not exist in the 
law.232 MacFarquhar’s article was nuanced but when the reports on Gulen are considered this 
article unfairly targeted the Egyptian individuals who did not condone homosexuality, 
especially since Gulen holds similar beliefs to quoted Egyptians in this article. As stated by 
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Tore Fougner “[Gulen] argues that ‘feminized men’ and ‘masculinized women’ are the devil’s 
work.”233 Somini Sengupta’s article on the Pope Francis’ African visit in 2015 stressed that he 
did not mention the issue of child marriage, condom use, violence against the LGBTQ+ 
community, or the high maternal death rate that were prevalent in Africa during his visit to a 
mosque which was the final destination of his trip.234 This article is significant because it 
showed the issues worth criticizing by the New York Times but when it comes to the Gulen 
movement none of these issues were even mentioned. 
Other articles that were published in the New York Times between 1985 and 2016 and 
did not employ the Orientalist approach were “Respecting Muslim Patients’ Needs” from 2010, 
reported about practicing Muslims who refused the services of medical doctors from opposite 
genders.235 “Muslim Boys at a Swiss School Must Shake Teachers’ Hands, Even Female Ones” 
from 2016 where both sides’ point of views reported objectively.236 Mujib Mashal’s 2016 article 
recounted the short life of Zahra, an Afghan minor who endured abuse in her marriage and 
eventually was set on fire while pregnant to her first child. When Zahra’s father claimed that it 
was acceptable to marry young children because it was conducted by the prophet Mohammad, 
Mashal explained the difference between tradition and religion rather than citing Islam as the 
cause for child marriages.237  
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As demonstrated by the examination of the thirty-four articles above, different 
journalists with different backgrounds and expertise wrote about problems in Muslim societies in 
the New York Times over a period of thirty-two years. While it is evident that there were articles 
that did not employ Orientalism when dealing with Muslims, Muslim societies, and Islam, the 
majority of the articles that were published in the New York Times could be considered 
Orientalist or neo-Orientalist. One of the most common characteristics of Orientalism that was 
prominent in these articles were the overgeneralization of Muslims and the portrayal of Islam as a 
monolithic source of negative things. In addition, the perceived resistance to change of Muslim 
societies were also emphasized by the journalists. It is especially important to emphasize that 
many practices that had drawn the attention of the New York Times journalists were completely 
ignored when done or encouraged by the Gulen movement of by Gulen himself. Child marriage, 
women’s and LGBTQ+ rights, violence against women, inter-religious tolerance, and access to 
modern education were the main topics that were ignored by the New York Times when it came to 
the Gulen movement.  
 When the Wall Street Journal articles that dealt with Islam, Muslims, Muslim minority 
and Muslim majority societies, starting with Karen Elliot House’s article “The West Will Remain 
Hostage” from 1985, thematically examined, they demonstrate that the Orientalist and neo-
Orientalist approaches had been continuously employed by the Wall Street Journal and the lack 
of criticism of the Gulen movement. Similar to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal 
ignored the issues of child marriage, women’s and LGBTQ+ rights, violence against women, 
inter-religious tolerance, and access to modern education when it came to the Gulen movement. 
The Wall Street Journal featured a news piece entitled “The West Will Remain Hostage” written 
by Karen Elliot House, the foreign editor in 1985, only six days after the hijack of TWA Flight 






more than five hundred Muslims from Israeli custody.238 The passengers were physically harmed, 
killed, and terrorized during the incident by the militants.239 Elliot House explained: 
And it's this basic, almost primitive, fact of political life -- rulers constantly worrying 
about their own physical survival -- that largely explains why the Middle East is likely to 
remain paralyzed. In the Mideast, terrorists don't simply hold hostages, terrorism holds 
the region and its rulers hostage.  
 
Elliot House also quoted the neo-Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis, she mentioned the lack of 
“free exchange of opinion,” in the Arab countries, she predicted that the Middle East would 
“remain a slaughterhouse for America and her friends for years to come,” and argued that 
America was a hostage to radical Islam as it was five years ago when America was taken hostage 
by “the ayatollah's Islamic zealots.”240 Elliot House also explained the pre-radical Islam Middle 
East by stating that “[…] The modern Mideast was a turbulent and violent part of the world 
before what is now called radical Islam reared its head.”241 Elliot House, by arguing that the 
Middle East and the Arab states were prone to violence by nature clearly employed Orientalism 
by not examining the reasons behind Islamic terrorism.  
Similar to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal also published articles that dealt 
with issues other than violence. Metin Demirsar and Brent Bowers wrote in 1985 that most 
women who were holding high ranks in the Turkish business world thought feminism was 
irrelevant and that they were opposed to gender equality. It was noted that this negative sentiment 
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of businesswomen was shared by their male colleagues as well.242 Demirsar and Bowers 
explained how gender was limiting Turkish women by stating that “Modern Turkey seems 
prepared to let [women] pursue their ambitions, so long as they follow the ancient sexual rules 
off the job.”243 This article, while pointing out differing views, could still be considered 
Orientalist. The authors overgeneralized the male business people’s opinion by asking only two 
people of their opinions, and only six women; in contrast providing only one different point of 
view from a sociologist, Mubeccel Kiray.244 In the article, the devoutly religious past of Turkey 
was emphasized as well. Barbara Rosewicz reported in 1987 that Al Azhar, the oldest and the 
most prestigious Islamic institution according to Rosewicz, “[…] explain ways in which 
moderate, mostly pro-Western governments use Islam today,” in “Prestigious Al Azhar Is a Force 
for Moderation.”245 In addition to this claim, Rosewicz pointed out the not-so-Western practices 
of Al Azhar, such as its barefoot students and the grand sheik's belief of women who dyed their 
hair "are doomed to hell and a bad destiny."246 Rosewicz referred to the institution as the “hotbed 
of moderate Islam,” and emphasized that the institution “hasn't changed much in 1,000 years.”247 
Rosewicz’s approach fits the characteristics of Orientalism since she emphasized the resistance to 
change of the institution and non-Western characteristics to strengthen the “us vs. them” 
narrative. Mary Williams Walsh’s article on the abstinence of women from the public sphere in 
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Pakistan was supported with reports on violence against woman in the country.248 While Willams 
Walsh noted that tradition also played a role in the widespread gender inequality and the violence 
against women, she also referred to Pakistan as the “land of arranged marriages” and cited the 
“Islamization” policies of the former president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq as a reason behind gender 
inequality.249 Williams Walsh’s overgeneralization of Pakistan as the “land of arranged 
marriages” and her claim that Islamization was the cause of systematic violence against women 
indicates her Orientalist approach. Another article from 1988 reported the growing number of in 
vitro fertilization clinics in Egypt and attributed the rapidly growing numbers to the complicated 
and often controversial place of adoption in Islam.250 In this article, Islam was cited as the sole 
reason for the growing number of in vitro fertilization clinics, and the general hostility towards 
adoption. Geraldine Brooks reported that the state-sanctioned oppression of women in Saudi 
Arabia in 1989 by stating that “Islam rules here.”251 Brooks quoted Don Kerr from London 
Institute for Strategic Studies when explaining the lack of Westernization of the country “When it 
came to things that are really important, they operate on the same basis they have always 
done.”252 Brooks demonstrated the slow change in the Saudi Arabian society as the following: 
But lest outsiders think nothing changes in Saudi Arabia, Mrs. al-Ammari, who is a 
member of a 10-woman consortium running a computer-training business, tells a story: 
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Just a generation ago, her mother was kidnapped and sold to a man who became her 
husband. At the age of eight, it was her second wedding. She had already been married 
once by family arrangement.253  
 
It is evident that Brooks’ article pointed Islam out as the source of women’s oppression in Saudi 
Arabia while the oppressive measures were enacted by the state. At the same time the article 
emphasized the Orient’s resistance to change by pointing out Mrs. al-Ammari’s mother’s 
marriage that happened when she was a child, a practice that would be considered unacceptable 
in a Western culture, while strengthening the “us vs. them” narrative. 
Peter Waldman’s report “Man Eyes Woman, She Smiles Back; This Is a Good Date? --- 
Kuwait Is Bribing Its Youth To Marry and Have Babies; But Singles Don't Buy In” examined the 
dating culture in Kuwait right after the Iraqi occupation in 1990.254 Waldman’s article focused on 
gender inequality in Kuwait, legal polygyny and interfamily sexual relations where cousins were 
encouraged to marry each other by their family members. Waldman stated that Kuwait was torn 
between the West and Islam and argued that the Kuwaiti national identity was underdeveloped 
“The Iraqi invasion awakened Kuwait to what it meant to be Kuwaiti: not much, except lots of 
money.”255 The Orientalist approach was evident in Waldman’s article, he oversimplified the 
Kuwaiti identity, emphasizing the “us vs. them” narrative by stating that the country is torn 
between the Quran and the West. Finally, Waldman concluded his piece with a North Carolinian 
woman’s words. Denise, who married a Kuwaiti man ten years earlier, was quoted saying "Some 
Kuwaitis who bring home wives from abroad turn into super-Arab demons. […] One guy won't 
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even let his wife talk about wearing pants, but then he goes around in shorts." The article 
continued: 
Denise and her husband have an unspoken pact. She keeps her American friends, 
especially the soldiers, away from her sisters-in-law. And he keeps his relatives away 
from their three daughters. "I don't want any of those cousins eying them -- no way!" 
Denise says. "My little girls are going to grow up to be doctors."256  
 
The article contributed to the “violent Arab male” narrative with these previous quotations. 
Tony Horwitz reported in 1991 that “Western-style democracy is unthinkable” in Saudi 
Arabia and explained that “Adulterers are stoned to death and murderers beheaded at a place 
known to foreigners as "Chop Square” in Saudi Arabia.”257 According to Horwitz’s article, the 
previous year a criminal’s dead body was left on view for the public after he was decapitated.258 
Horwitz’s article emphasized the difference between the “Occident” and the “Orient” by stating 
how a “Western-style” democracy was impossible because of certain punishment practices. In 
1999 Steve Liesman reported the driving ban for women in Saudi Arabia. Liesman’s article 
concluded with a Saudi woman’s remarks where she listed the dress code and the driving ban as 
the two hardest things about living in Saudi Arabia.259 “Change comes slowly in a nation where 
modernism and traditionalism have always been in conflict. This is, after all, the world's center of 
Islam […]” Liesman stated, indicating this Muslim nation’s resistance to change.260  
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Michael M. Phillip’s article “Muslim Nations, Vatican Oppose U.N. Declaration on 
AIDS,” from 2001, dealt with the disagreement between “Canada, Australia, the EU and many 
Latin American countries” and Vatican and Muslim countries over identifying risky groups which 
were vulnerable to AIDS. “[…] and particularly whether to include men who have sex with men, 
people who have multiple sex partners, sex workers, and their clients, injecting drug users and 
their sexual partners" explained Phillip.261 Phillip referred to Iran, Egypt, and Syria as “Middle 
Eastern nations” and “Muslim nations,” while leaving out the other eighteen Middle Eastern 
nations and, forty-six countries that are Muslim majority countries. Phillip clearly employed 
Orientalism in this article since he overgeneralized the Muslim majority nations and simply 
referred to three specific countries as “Muslim nations,” and the “Middle Eastern nations.” It is 
worth stressing that Fethullah Gulen, who also stated that HIV and AIDS were diseases that least 
affected Muslims because “The noble values and morality of the Islamic way of life have 
protected Muslims against such a disaster […]” was never criticized for his point of view by the 
Wall Street Journal.262 
In “What Muslim Women Want,” written by Geneive Abdo and Dalia Mogahed from 
the Center for Muslim Studies at the Gallup Organization, claimed that majority of Muslim 
women from twenty-two predominantly Muslim countries wanted their country’s laws to be 
based on the Sharia law according to Gallup surveys in 2006.263 Abdo and Mogahed argued that 
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“embracing Islam” was “expressed by wearing the hijab,” dismissed Turkish women’s views by 
stating that “In nearly every country surveyed, aside from officially secular Turkey, a majority of 
women say Islamic law should either be the primary source of legislation or a source.” Abdo and 
Mogahed’s article employed an Orientalist approach because the Muslim women were 
overgeneralized along with the definition of Muslim, the authors indicated that embracing Islam 
was only possible by wearing the hijab.264 
Unlike the New York Times, in the Wall Street Journal, the lines between women’s 
rights and Muslims’ violent tendencies were blurred at times. For example, Peter Waldman noted 
in 1994 that under the Iranian civil law, women were not equal to men especially when it came to 
divorce.265 Waldman stated that “The religiously privileged -- in this case, males -- make out like 
bandits.” While Waldman stated that Islam was not the problem, the article repeatedly referred to 
the Sharia Law as the sole cause of gender inequality in Iran.266 Waldman’s article repeatedly 
stated that even violence against women was not seen as a legitimate reason for divorce; while 
the articles on the Gulen movement looked the other way on the same issue. Fethullah Gulen 
stated that while the divorce was allowed in Islam, it is one of the worst acts a person could 
commit that was not considered a sin.267 Another article published on the official website of 
Gulen, fGulen.com, explained that when Gulen stated that women who did not have kids would 
have been allowed to divorce their husbands if their husband was committing violent acts against 
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them but he did not mean a simple slap on the face.268 The author of this article, Ahmet Kurucan, 
explained that, while it was not condoned, husband’s slapping of his wife cannot be considered a 
legitimate reason for divorce since it was a common and understandable occurrence in the heat of 
arguments.269 Daniel Pearl wrote about the oppression on the social life in Iran and the young 
people who were actively trying to flee to the United States as a result of the strict governmental 
control over their social lives in 1996.270 Pearl cited the Islamic regime of Iran for the social 
oppression of Iranians, while not acknowledging that the Iranian regime had a peculiar way of 
interpreting Islam. Naomi Schaefer Riley wrote in 2006 that “Polygamy today is most popular in 
cultures that are relatively backward and impoverished,” and cited Malaysia, Uganda, and Turkey 
as examples of these cultures where polygyny was practiced. Schaefer Riley stated that Bernard 
Accoyer, a French politician, cited the widely common practice of polygyny among the Muslim 
minority in French as one of the main reasons for the then-recent riots in Paris. Schaefer Riley 
agreed with this argument by pointing out the outcomes of systematic polygyny: families living 
in poverty and young men with not much to do while recognizing that Accoyer was denounced 
for racism.271 Schaefer Riley’s article was openly Orientalist, she referred to two Muslim-
majority and one African country as “backward,” while she referred to the same practice in the 
Netherlands as the “social habits of the Dutch.”272 Matt Bradley’s article from 2013 was on 
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Khaled Abdullah, an Egyptian tele-preacher who supported marital rape, who was also against 
LGBTQ+ rights and atheists. Bradley wrote: 
The Salafi TV preachers advocate restrictive views on women, railing against female 
protesters and even advising audiences of what they see as the Islamically correct way for 
a husband to beat his wife.273 
 
Bradley’s article did not employ an Orientalist approach, he did not overgeneralize all Egyptians 
but rather pointed out an alarming new trend. However, this article demonstrates the positive 
portrayal of Gulen since Gulen is also openly advising on how to beat women. Bradley’s article 
referred to Abdullah as a Salafi, which he explained is “an austere practice of Islam that seeks to 
imitate the lifestyle, and even dress, of the Prophet Muhammad and early Muslims” while Gulen 
has been referred as a moderate by the Wall Street Journal.274 
Similar to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal also reported on LGBTQ+ rights 
in Muslim societies. Sara Schonhardt penned “Indonesia's Gays Face a Backlash After 
Advancing” in 2016 examined the human rights abuses against the homosexual men in Indonesia 
and pointed out that “Homosexuality is not illegal similar to many Arab countries but the 
LGBTQ+ individuals still face harassment and human rights abuses.”275 This is another nuanced 
article where the author did not employ the Orientalist approach, but it demonstrates the positive 
portrayal of Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement since both known for their hostility against 
the LGBTQ+ communities, yet, this side of the Gulen movement had never been acknowledged 
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by the Wall Street Journal.276 “Terror in Orlando: A Punitive Line on Homosexuality,” written by 
Karen Leigh and Asa Fitch, harshly criticized the majority of Muslims’ stance towards 
homosexuality around the world.277 The article argued that even the most liberal Arab nations 
were hostile to the LGBTQ+ communities, and at least in ten Muslim majority countries 
homosexuality was punishable by death.278 Leigh and Fitch did not mention the non-Muslim 
majority countries that had hostile laws against the LGBTQ+ communities such as Russia and 
Lithuania and countries that recently criminalized same-sex relations between women such as 
Zambia and Tanzania.279 Leigh and Fitch’s approach fits the definition of Orientalism since they 
overgeneralized Muslims as hostile to LGBTQ+ communities, treated Islam as a monolithic 
entity that was the cause of this hostility, and emphasized the civilized vs. uncivilized narrative 
by pointing out the hostility against the LGBTQ+ communities in Arab states.  
 Radical Islam was another prominent subject that was reported by the Wall Street 
Journal. Thomas Kamm’s article from 1995 examined the branches of moderate and radical 
Islam in France.280 While Kamm’s article was balanced in portraying differing opinions on Islam 
and Muslims it also failed to acknowledge the secular Muslims living in France. The article 
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deducted diverse interpretations of Islam into “radical” or “moderate.” Overgeneralization of 
French Muslims indicated Kamm’s Orientalist approach. M. Zuhdi Jasser, an American-Muslim 
military man, penned the article “The Islamist Threat Inside Our Military” that was published in 
2011 pointed out “the ideological struggle between Americanism and Islamism.”281 Jasser’s self-
Orientalist approach was evident in his article, he portrayed Islam as a monolithic religion and 
argued that one cannot be loyal to the United States, a secular country, and to “The Ummah 
(Muslim nation.)”282 
Faisal Shahzad, the confessed Times Square bomber, stated to the judge at his 
arraignment, "We Muslims are one community. We are not divided." He proclaimed that 
he was a "mujahid" or a "Muslim soldier." Nidal Hasan similarly called himself a "Soldier 
of Allah." This self-identification is central to the Islamist threat. 
 
While Jasser emphasized that there were many secular Muslim leaders and many Muslim 
servicemen and women who were serving in the military honorably, the article indicated that 
there were only two branches of Islam: the one aligns with the West and the one that is the enemy 
of it.283 Salam Al-Marayati and Maher Hathout voiced their opinion on the question if Islam 
needed to reform in “Let Islamic Reform Start in America” published in 2014.284 Al-Marayati 
and Hathout’s article opened with Bernard Lewis’s claim of a possibility of the Westernized 
Muslims helping the Middle East on issues regarding minority rights and secularization. 
“American Muslims have the freedom and the intellectual capacity to create positive change for 
Islamic reform,” argued Al-Marayati and Hathout in their evidently neo-Orientalist article.285 
This article overgeneralized non-American Muslims portrayed them as an uncivilized group that 
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needed to be civilized by the Westernized American Muslims and represented Islam as 
monolithic.  
Andrew Higgins’ 2009 article on Adnan Oktar, a famous creationist and an eccentric TV 
personality, drawn attention to the growing tendency to accept creationism among the educated 
Turkish youth. Higgins quoted Aykut Kence, a scholar from the Biology department of the 
Middle Eastern Technical University, “If people can't accept Darwin, they can't accept science. 
They can't think," stated Kence.286 Higgins stated that Oktar had relations with the Vatican and 
that creationism was mostly a Christian idea which was imported to Turkey.287 The same issue 
had been previously examined in the Wall Street Journal by Daniel Golden in 2002, and it was 
evident that the newspaper had no reservations in criticizing the creationist movement.288 These 
two articles demonstrate the positive portrayal of Gulen since not a single article in the Wall 
Street Journal, out of one hundred and seventy-three, pointed out the fact that Gulen is a 
creationist. 
 Again, similar to the New York Times, not all articles in the Wall Street Journal employed 
Orientalism when dealing with Muslims. In 2000, Geraldine Brooks wrote about the lack of 
women’s sports in Muslim-majority nations such as Iran and Bahrain and how athletes were 
struggling to flourish under very strict rules against women’s participation in sports.289 “In many 
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conservative Muslim Gulf countries, women's sports don't exist,” stated Brooks, “[Bahrain] has 
been quicker to accept wider women's roles than its neighbors,” explained further.290 Brooks’ 
article clearly stated that every Muslim country was different when it came to allowing women to 
play sports and did not cite Islam as the cause of the inequality in sports. Said Summer and Ellen 
Knickmeyer wrote in 2012 that the Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al Saud appointed a 
moderate cleric as the head of the country’s moral police. The newly appointed Sheik Abdulatif 
al-Sheikh supported greater rights to women and vehemently opposed child marriage according 
to the report.291 Summer and Knickmeyer repeatedly pointed out that the Saudi reformers were 
hoping that Sheik Abdulatif al-Sheikh would enforce a different interpretation of the Islamic 
Law, indicating that there were Islamic Laws and not a single interpretation.  
  A close examination of the sixty articles above from the New York Times and the Wall 
Street Journal demonstrates that neither of these newspapers was completely free of Orientalism 
when it comes to Muslims, Muslim societies, and Islam between 1985 and 2016. While it is also 
evident that there were a couple of articles published by the New York Times and the Wall Street 
Journal that were nuanced and did not employ Orientalism, the majority of the articles still fit the 
definition of Orientalism and/or neo-Orientalism. Since this section demonstrated the journalists’ 
approach to Islam and Muslims in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal, the next 
section will examine the portrayal of the Gulen movement to demonstrate that the movement had 
been positively portrayed by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. The following 
chapter will examine and demonstrate why this portrayal is problematic.  
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THE POSITIVE PORTRAYAL OF FETHULLAH GULEN AND THE GULEN 
MOVEMENT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES AND IN THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 
For this section, I examined Fethullah Gulen and his movement’s portrayal between the 
years 1998 and 2016 in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal. Before 1998, there 
were not any accounts either on Gulen or on the movement. The articles on the Gulen movement 
were only critical or investigative of Gulen and his movement when the reported issue was about 
Gulen affiliated charter schools. Almost none of the articles were critical or even investigative of 
Gulen’s ideology. The articles that dealt with the rivalry between the once prime minister, and the 
current president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen 
movement also failed to examine or accurately represent the ideology of the Gulen movement. 
And finally, articles that directly focused on the Gulen movement and Fethullah Gulen, in 
addition to lacking criticism and proper investigation of Gulen and the movement, usually 
referred to the people who opposed Gulen as radical seculars. I identified five articles that 
pointed out the questionable nature of the movement and Fethullah Gulen but the majority of the 
articles that dealt directly with Gulen falsely portrayed the movement as a moderate religious 
movement. The following section will thematically examine the articles, starting with the charter 
schools issue, I will then examine Gulen’s portrayal in articles that focused on the feud between 
Erdogan and Gulen, and finally, the last part will demonstrate the articles that focused solely on 
Gulen that misrepresented and falsely portrayed the movement as moderate without mentioning 
the alarming characteristics of the movement and Gulen’s ideology. It is also worth noting that 
there is no exact definition of “moderate Muslim” and the meaning has been debated.292 A 
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scholar from the University of Leiden, Alex P. Schmidt, used Julia Tallmeister’s definition of 
moderation in his article “Moderate Muslims and Islamist Terrorism: Between Denial and 
Resistance:”293 
Islamist movements that attempt to achieve their goals through bottom-up, non-violent 
methods, and are able to both accept democratic values and tolerate perspectives other 
than their own. In the same sense, ideological moderation is defined as the gradual 
transformation of a movement’s core values and beliefs from rigid and fixed, to flexible 
and tolerant.  
 
Zeyno Baran’s definition also stressed toleration as one of the main characteristics of moderation: 
“Moderate and secular Muslims, who embrace the compatibility of Islam and democracy and the 
individual freedoms we all cherish in the West […]”294 Based on these two definitions of 
moderate Muslim, it would be safe to say that the definition would include internalized tolerance, 
flexibility, and the non-violent outlook. Based on this definition, classifying Gulen and the Gulen 
movement as “moderate” is not accurate. While Gulen and the Gulen movement vehemently 
support non-violence to non-Muslims and male Muslims, they cannot be considered tolerant, 
since some of Gulen’s writings were essentially homophobic, or cannot be considered completely 
non-violent since Gulen supports violence against women. An examination of the problematic 
elements of Gulen and the movement’s ideology will be discussed in detail in the following 
chapter. At the end of this section, I will briefly examine the more neutral and critical articles and 
explain why they could be considered critical.  
Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement started to appear in the New York Times 
during the 2000s. Gulen’s name first mentioned by the New York Times in “World Briefing” 
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section in 1999, where Gulen was referred as a “leader of a secretive sect.” Before the rivalry 
between Gulen and Erdogan, Gulen mostly garnered the attention of the New York Times for the 
movement affiliated schools and the controversies surrounding them. In 2006, Samantha M. 
Shapiro stated that Gulen was a “part of a new trend of religious leaders who want a conservative 
religion that can function in harmony with a globalized world” in the New York Times Magazine 
where she referred to Gulen as “Sufi master.295 Sabrina Tavernise’s article, contributed by 
Sebnem Arsu, was published in March 2008 described Fethullah Gulen as someone who 
“combines Sufi religious philosophy with modern science, offering a blend of Islamic tradition 
and secular modernism in hundreds of schools that his followers have built.”296 The emphasis on 
alleged secularism of Gulen schools persisted throughout the years. In May 2008, Tavernise 
described the Gulen movement and affiliated schools as a moderate alternative to radical Islam 
that was becoming prominent in Pakistan. Tavernise stated that Gulen movement’s view of Islam 
was “moderate and flexible, comfortably coexisting with the West while remaining distinct from 
it,” and that the movement was “like Muslim Peace Corps volunteers, they promote this approach 
in schools, which are now established in more than 80 countries, Muslim and Christian.”297 
Gulen’s ideology claimed to be STEM friendly by Tavernise, Gulen’s approach to science and 
religion was explained as "without science, religion turns to radicalism, and without religion, 
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science is blind and brings the world to danger" by one of Gulen’s followers.298 The article 
argued that Said Nursi’s followers, the theologian whom Gulen was influenced of, “were seeking 
ways to coexist with [science].”299 While the next chapter discusses these claims in detail, it is 
worth noting that Gulen is a creationist and frequently denied the scientific consensus. Adama 
Diop, a scholar from the Dakar University in Senegal, wrote on Gulen’s approach to science and 
evolution in an article that can still be found on Fethullah Gulen’s official website.300 Diop said 
that “F. Gulen was aiming to change society through Education. The system he advocates gives 
priority to the teaching of SCIENCES, Science being considered as a tool for understanding the 
miracles of the Quran,” when he was explaining how Gulen affiliated schools helped to change 
the education system in Sub-Saharan Africa.301 Another evidence of Gulen’s anti-evolution 
stance could be also found on his official website. Taken from one of his books, Questions and 
Answers About Islam Vol. I, Gulen argued that the theory of evolution was not factual.302 
Stephanie Saul’s article, published in 2011, examined the controversy surrounding the charter 
schools in Texas, allegedly owned by the Gulen movement.303 Saul stated that Gulen “Preaches 
the need to embrace modernity in a peace-loving, ecumenical version of Islam. At the center of 
his philosophy is the concept of “hizmet” — public service.”304 While Saul pointed out the 
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controversy regarding the charter schools and dealt extensively with the allegedly corrupt visa 
practices and corruption in awarding contracts, she did not criticize or point out the problematic 
aspects of the movement itself.305 David Lepeska’s article that dealt with a Gulen affiliated 
Islamic college in Chicago, the American Islamic College, referred to the Gulen movement as a 
“secretive movement.”306 The article reported that the Gulen (Hizmet) movement promoted 
“public service and education and oversees research institutes, universities, media outlets and one 
of Turkey's largest banks.”307 According to Lepeska, the school officials argued that the school 
aligned with Gulen’s religious ideology, which claimed to be “a more moderate form of 
Islam.”308 While Lepeska emphasized the allegedly corrupt visa practices employed by Gulen 
affiliated schools, he did not mention any of the ideological allegations against Gulen and the 
Gulen movement.309 Stephanie Saul’s article “Audits for 3 Georgia Schools Tied to Turkish 
Movement” is another example of the lack of criticism of Gulen’s ideology.310 The article pointed 
out the dubious visa practices of the Gulen schools in the U.S. but also emphasized that while the 
schools were “inspired by Mr. Gulen and teach Turkish language and culture,” stated Saul, “they 
did not teach religion.”311 Tim Arango’s article of Gulen “Raids and Graft Inquiry in Turkey Are 
Seen by Some as Muslim Cleric's Plot” referred to him as a “Charismatic preacher who leads one 
of the most influential Islamic movements in the world and commands an empire of secular 
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schools […]”312 It is evident that the New York Times journalists were emphasizing the secular 
nature of these schools while also pointing out the bureaucratic controversy surrounding them.  
Aside from news regarding the Gulen-affiliated charter schools, Gulen was featured in 
the New York Times for the polarizing rivalry between Erdogan and his movement. The 
commonality shared by these articles is that they referred to Gulen as a “preacher,” or a “leader,” 
but failed to explain the movement’s ideology other than a couple of generic sentences that stated 
Gulen owned a media empire and had been living in the U.S. on a self-exile since 1999. Tim 
Arango and Sebnem Arsu wrote “Growing Corruption Inquiry Hits Close to Turkish Leader” in 
2013, where they argued that Fethullah Gulen and Erdogan “combined forces in a battle with the 
country's secular military elite, sending them back to the barracks in recent years and establishing 
Turkey as a successful example of a moderate, democratic Islamic government.”313 Fethullah 
Gulen was portrayed as pro-Israel and the article indicated that the power struggle between 
Erdogan and Gulen was due to their disagreements on Turkish foreign policy.314 A Gulen 
affiliate, Huseyin Gulerce, explained that the followers of the Gulen movement were complaining 
about the growingly authoritarian Erdogan regime and the abandonment of the “pursuit of 
membership in the European Union.”315 Another article by Arango and Arsu claimed that the 
Erdogan-Gulen collaboration “aimed to rid Turkish politics of the influence of the military, 
which carried out three coups in the 20th century and protected the secular elite while oppressing 
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the pious classes.”316 The article barely mentioned why Gulen had to leave Turkey in 1999 by 
stating that “[Gulen left Turkey] for exile in America after he was accused of trying to establish 
an Islamic state.”317 The authors avoided mentioning why the accusations were made in the first 
place –as a result of a leaked footage where Gulen was instructing his followers to infiltrate the 
state institutions.318 In contrast, an article written by Dan Bilefsky and Sebnem Arsu, in 2012, 
reported the so-called politically motivated charges against journalists under the name of 
“Sledgehammer” by the Turkish government. This article briefly touched upon the alleged role of 
the Gulen movement in the alleged “political purge” by stating that according to analysts the 
Gulen movement’s members “have infiltrated the highest levels of the country’s police and 
judiciary.”319 While an article written by Ceylan Yeginsu only two years later, in 2014, pointed 
out Gulen’s affiliation with the Sledgehammer case and the extensive use of dubious evidence, 
Bilefsky and Arsu’s article mainly dealt with Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s growingly oppressive 
government.320 Two other articles written by Ceylan Yeginsu, one in 2014, the other in 2015, 
referred to Gulen as an “influential Muslim cleric” and solely dealt with mutual allegations 
between Erdogan and Gulen’s followers without providing any information regarding Gulen’s 
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ideology.321 In Tim Arango’s account, Gulen was portrayed as the owner of an empire of secular 
schools.322 The article quoted Jenny White, a scholar at the Stockholm University Institute for 
Turkish Studies. “The goal,” White said, “is to create a "golden generation of young people who 
are educated in science, but have Muslim ethics.”323 Another expert who was quoted in the article 
was James F. Jeffrey, former U.S. ambassador to Turkey, claimed that the Gulen movement was 
a “cultlike” movement while arguing that it would have been near impossible for Gulenists to 
infiltrate the armed forces.324 The article did not feature any Turkish scholars’ opinion. Sebnem 
Arsu and Brian Knowlton wrote in their 2014 article that Gulen “Promotes a moderate, pro-
Western brand of Sunni Islam that appeals to many well-educated and professional Turks, once 
made common cause against the country's staunchly secular military and political leadership.”325 
Arsu and Knowlton did not explain why they preferred to refer Gulen’s ideology as “moderate” 
and “pro-Western.” An editorial from 2014 also referred to Gulen as a promoter of “a moderate, 
pro-Western brand of Sunni Islam that appeals to many well-educated and professional Turks.”326 
In 2015, Katie Rogers referred to Gulen as a critic of Erdogan in her article “Turkey Frees Two 
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Journalists, but a Colleague Is Still Held.”327 Stephanie Saul’s article regarding the attempted 
coup accusations targeting Gulen, from 2016, mainly focused on the Gulen’s accusations of 
Erdogan and comparing the current Turkish government to Nazi Germany.328 Saul’s account 
lacked any sort of criticism of the Gulen movement and she defined the movement as: 
At the core of his movement, promoted as a peace-loving form of Islam, is the concept of 
Hizmet, which his followers describe as a type of public service.329 
 
Some other articles that dealt with the power struggle between Erdogan and Gulen that 
did not include any examination of Gulen’s ideology and simply refer to him as a “spiritual 
leader,” “cleric,” “imam,” or a “preacher” are the following: “Purge of Police Said to Be Move 
by Turkey to Disrupt Graft Inquiry;” “In Push Against Muslim Cleric, Turkey Detains Police 
Officers and Journalists;” “Turks Are Glued to a Sensational Drama, This One Political;” 
“Turkish Officers Convicted in 2012 Coup Case Are Released; In Scandal,” “Turkey's Leaders 
May Be Losing Their Tight Grip on The news media;” “Not on Ballot, Turkey's Premier Still 
Gets Push From Party in Local Elections;” “A Debate Becomes a Brawl as Turkey's Parliament 
Votes to Rein In Courts;”  “Turkey: Cleric's Passport Is Revoked; In Blow to Turkish President;” 
“Court Halts Closing of Schools;” “Turkey's Wrong Turn; “Sharp Denials After Arrest of 
Journalists in Turkey;” “Prosecutor Overseeing Turkish Graft Inquiry Is Removed From Case;” 
“Premier Tries to Keep Power, as President;” “Obama Meets Erdogan in an Effort to Patch Up 
Differences With Turkey;” “Number of Imprisoned Journalists Hits Record, Advocacy Group 
Says;” “A Complicated Alliance With Turkey;” “Turkey Purges Thousands and Blocks 
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Wikipedia;” “Angela Merkel, Meeting With Erdogan in Turkey, Emphasizes Free Speech;” “40 
Sentenced to Life for Plot to Assassinate Turkey's President.”330 
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The articles that focused solely on Gulen or the Gulen movement were a rarity in the 
New York Times in comparison to charter schools and the rivalry between Gulen and Erdogan. 
However, the earliest article on Gulen, published in 2000, “Turkish Court Voids Warrant for 
Islamic Leader” referred to Gulen as a “prominent Islamic leader” and pointed out his 
connections with “senior politicians and religious leaders” was an article solely on Gulen and his 
movement.331 The article also stated how Gulen explained his motives, “[He] only wanted Turkey 
to be more tolerant of ethnic and religious diversity.”332 “Turkey Assails a Revered Islamic 
Moderate” written in 2000 by Douglas Frantz referred to the Gulen movement as a “prospering 
Islamic community,” stated that Gulen “promoted a moderate brand of Islam.” 333 This article 
also argued that a possibility of an extradition request for Gulen from the Turkish authorities 
unsettled the liberals who were not associated with the Gulen movement; an argument that 
indicated the liberal nature of the movement. Frantz also reported that Gulen argued that he was 
seeking a more tolerant government which “treated ethnic and ideological differences as a 
cultural mosaic, not a reason for discrimination.”334 Frantz also praised Gulen’s schools by 
stating that they were expensive private schools with religious curriculum approved by the 
state.335 Neither of these articles did provide the points of views of the people who were critical 
of the movement and only mentioned them as “the secular hard-liners” or the “secular elite.” By 
ignoring the diversity among the critics of Gulen the authors overgeneralized his critics labeling 
them as “extreme seculars.” In 2009, the New York Times referred to Taraf, a pro-Gulenist 
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newspaper that was often criticized for its fabrication of evidence during the Sledgehammer case 
that resulted in a purge of the seculars in the Turkish Armed Forces, as a “liberal newspaper.”336 
Tavernise’s 2010 article “Army Ebbs, And Power Realigns In Turkey,” mentioned the possibility 
of Gulen’s involvement in the alleged effort of the government’s campaign to silence the 
opposition. Tavernise referred to Gulen as a “preacher” and the Gulen movement as an “Islamic 
network.” Tavernise did not point out the questionable evidence provided by Taraf and the anti-
secularism allegations about Gulen and the Gulen movement. Rock Gladstone’s account on 
Gulen from 2016 stated that Gulen “is the overseer of a religious movement that runs schools, 
charities and other enterprises in a number of countries, but that the Turkish government 
considers a terrorist organization.”337 In 2016, Fethullah Gulen himself referred to his movement 
as moderate in an article he authored in the New York Times.338 
At a time when Western democracies are searching for moderate Muslim voices, I and my 
friends in the Hizmet movement have taken a clear stance against extremist violence, 
from the Sept. 11 attacks by Al Qaeda to brutal executions by the Islamic State to the 
kidnappings by Boko Haram.339 
 
In 2016, an article written by Tim Arango, Ceylan Yeginsu, and Safak Timur explained 
that “[Gulen] has been embraced in the past by the West for espousing a vision of moderate Islam 
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and interfaith dialogue.”340 Again in 2016, the New York Times claimed that Gulen “Has 
promoted a more liberal stream of Islam […]”341  
While the vast majority of the articles published in the New York Times did not properly 
and factually portray Gulen and the Gulen movement there were a couple of articles that stood 
apart from the majority. An article written by Dan Bilefsky and Sebnem Arsu explained the 
controversies surrounding the movement in 2012.342 Mustafa Akyol’s account from 2016 pointed 
out the hierarchical structure of the movement and the cultish characteristics.343  
 Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement mostly garnered the attention of the Wall Street 
Journal because of the rivalry between Gulen and Erdogan. The charter school issue was 
virtually uncovered by the Wall Street Journal which was one of the most covered topics 
regarding the Gulen movement in the New York Times. The number of articles written on Gulen 
and the movement before the Gulen vs. Erdogan rivalry was also limited. Regardless of the topics 
and the quantity of the articles, the evidence demonstrates the positive portrayal of Gulen and the 
Gulen movement in the Wall Street Journal. Based on the evidence, it would be fair to argue that 
the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal employed a similarly positive outlook to Gulen 
and the Gulen movement. 
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The first report that focused solely on Fethullah Gulen in the Wall Street Journal dates 
back to 1998. Hugh Pope’s portrayal of Gulen pointed out that even though the Turkish 
government was worried about Gulen infiltrating the state he was accepted by the Pope Jean Paul 
II, which was “A rare honor for a Turkish Muslim.”344 Pope also stated that Gulen was one of 
Turkey’s most respected Muslim leaders.345 Pope’s article implied that Gulen was legitimized 
since he was accepted by a Christian religious leader.346 Claire Berlinski stated in 2010 that there 
were conspiracy theories against the Gulen movement while pointing out the Gulenists’ theories 
were also impossible to prove.347 Berlinski did not provide any evidence for the fears surrounding 
the Gulen movement, even though what the Gulen movement openly advocating was against 
many Turkish laws, such as encouraging violence against women.348  In 2010, Joe Lauria also 
praised Gulen: 
Mr. Gulen preaches nonviolence, dialogue between Western and Muslim worlds, and an 
educational tradition that combines study of science and Islam. His newspaper columns, 
weekly Internet sermons and other messages have been collected into more than 60 
books.349 
 
Lauria’s article did not provide the names of the books, nor it mentioned any of Gulen’s writings 
that cannot be considered “moderate.” The same year Andrew Mango described Fethullah Gulen 
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as a preacher who wanted to “engage with the modern world.”350 Asli Aydintasbas stated that 
Nedim Sener, a journalist, got arrested recently because he “Exposed the influence of Fethullah 
Gulen -- an Islamic preacher living in the United States -- on Turkish security forces.”351 While 
Aydintasbas’ article focused on the allegedly politically motivated arrests of journalists, it did not 
mention Gulen for the second time in this article.  
The power struggle between Erdogan and Gulen attracted some serious interest from the 
Wall Street Journal. Emre Peker, in his 2013 article, referred to Gulen as “a reclusive, influential 
Muslim cleric,” and explained the movement as “the moderate Islamic movement is estimated to 
have at least a million followers including AKP lawmakers, prosecutors and police in Turkey.”352 
Another article by Peker, published a couple of days after the previous article, stated that 
“[Erdogan’s] supporters seem to have fallen out with a faction loyal to a former ally, Fethullah 
Gulen, whose millions of followers helped elect Mr. Erdogan three times.”353 A few more articles 
written around this time by Peker credited Gulen for Erdogan’s success and referred to Gulen as 
“Erdogan’s rival” but did not examine the nature of the movement.354 Soner Cagaptay stated that 
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the Gulen movement promoted “conservative yet relatively modern” message in 2013 in an 
article he co-wrote with Jim Jeffrey.355 In 2014, Joe Parkinson and Ayla Albayrak portrayed 
Gulen as a charismatic cleric who “preaches a message of tolerance to his millions of followers 
from his self-imposed exile.”356 Parkinson and Albayrak also argued that Gulen “gained a broad 
following for his moderate sermons in the 1960s and '70s.”357 Parkinson and Albayrak ignored 
the fact that Gulen was tried for his remarks during sermons and his sermons were not considered 
moderate by the secular Turkish law.358 Another Parkinson article referred to Gulen simply as a 
“Turkish imam,” along with Emre Peker’s more recent article co-authored with Ayla Albayrak 
from 2014, where Gulen was referred as a “U.S.-based cleric,” did not mention any of the 
controversies surrounding the movement or Gulen.359 Some other articles where the authors 
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referred to Gulen as “cleric,” “imam,” “preacher,” or simply as “former ally of Erdogan” and did 
not examine the nature of the movement and Gulen’s ideology are the following: “Struggle in 
Turkey Tarnishes Lender,” “Soccer Club Chief Sees Plot Behind His Conviction,” “World News: 
Turf Fight Escalates Amid Turkish Cases,” “World News: Social-Network Sites Under Fire in 
Turkey,” “World News: Turkish Court Tries Alleged Coup Plotters --- Move Against President's 
Opponents Puts Dozens of Soccer Fans on Trial,” “World News: Turkish Scandal Ripples in 
U.S.,” “Net Loss: Turkey Builds New Model For Web Censorship,” “Global Finance: Turkey 
Takes Over Bank, As Political Fight Heats Up,” “World News: Turkish Court Acquits Officers in 
Coup Plot --- Reversal of convictions seen to help president's effort to fix damaged ties with 
armed forces,” “World News: Government Seizes Bank Caught Up In Politics,” “World News: 
Two TV Stations Seized in Istanbul,” “A Christian Pastor in Turkey's Prisons,” “World News: 
Turkey Sentences Officers for Coup,” “World News: U.N. Orders Turkey To Release Judge,” 
“World News: NBA Star Dodges a Turkish Crackdown --- 'It's Crazy,' Thunder's Kanter says of 
effort to round up foes of President Erdogan,” and “Erdogan's American Enemies List” where the 
author Sohrab Ahmari pointed out that Bernard Lewis was accurately predicted the future of 
Turkey as a country that accepted a “Some form of Islamist rule.”360 
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The Wall Street Journal also provided a medium for Gulen to publish his own article in 
2015. “Muslims Must Combat the Extremist Cancer” written by Gulen, was published on 
September 4th, right before the anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, argued that every Muslim should 
promote human rights: 
[…] Muslims must publicly promote human rights -- dignity, life and liberty. These are 
the most basic of Islamic values and no individual, nor any political or religious leader, 
has the authority to snatch them away. Living the essence of our faith means respecting 
diversity -- cultural, social, religious and political. God identifies learning from one 
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another as the primary goal of diversity (Quran 49:13). Respecting each human being as a 
creation of God (17:70) is respecting God.361 
 
Gulen argued that Muslim societies must provide modern education to their members and that 
was what the “Hizmet” movement had been doing with more than a thousand schools around the 
world. He also emphasized the importance of women’s equality in society and pointed out that 
Muhammad’s wife Aisha was a well-educated teacher and a community leader.362 Regardless of 
what Gulen argued on the pages of the Wall Street Journal, the evidence demonstrates that this 
was a false self-representation. The next chapter will examine and demonstrate why Gulen’s 
claims regarding human rights, respecting diversity, and respecting every human along with 
women’s equality and modern education would be discredited by his own writings.  
The rivalry between Erdogan and Gulen got escalated after the failed coup attempt in 
2016 where Erdogan blamed Gulen for masterminding the coup. The charter school controversy 
regarding the movement also garnered interest from the Wall Street Journal for the first time in 
2016. While the earliest article published in 2014 which recognized Gulen’s ties with the U.S. 
charter schools, it was not until 2016 the controversies were recognized.363 Dan Frosch’s article, 
“U.S. News: Turkey Ties Dissident to U.S. Schools,” was the first article in the Wall Street 
Journal that pointed out the Gulen movement owned charter schools and focused on the 
complaint filed by the lawyers of the Turkish government against the schools. This article 
reported the claims of the Turkish government rather than examining the actual controversies 
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surrounding the schools like the New York Times.364 Beckie Strum’s article was also similar to 
Frosch’s article and only dealt with the allegations of the Turkish government.365 Douglas Belkin 
and Tawnell D. Hobbs’ article “World News: Texas Probes Gulen Tie to Schools” also only 
reported the allegations of the Turkish government.366 Saeed Shah explained the Gulen 
movement’s schools in Pakistan by stating that “Its 26 fee-based schools educate some 10,000 
children and have a reputation for quality education and moderate religious views.”367 In August 
2016, Barrett Devlin and Adam Entous became the first Wall Street Journal authors who pointed 
out the “Long-running Federal Bureau of Investigation probe into whether financial crimes were 
committed at U.S. schools linked to Mr. Gulen.”368 Thomas Grove argued that Gulen’s ideology 
aligned with moderate Islam in 2016 by stating that “[Gulen] started a series of schools aimed at 
giving poorer Turkish students a quality education at an affordable price, albeit laden with his 
version of moderate Islam.”369 Douglas Belkin, Jeanne Ianthe Dugan, and Beckie Strum 
portrayed Gulen as a moderate in their 2016 article. “Mr. Gulen, who preaches a moderate brand 
of Islam,” claimed the authors “is known for his powerful sermons on peace, tolerance and 
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harmony, spread via books and video.”370 Another article by the same authors, also published in 
2016, explained Gulen’s success by stating that “Mr. Gulen rose to prominence in Turkey in the 
1980s with his moderate Islamic teachings combining religion, democracy and science.”371 The 
same year, Margaret Cooker referred to Gulen as a “moderate religious leader” in her article 
“World News: Turkey Premier Urges U.S. Help.”372  
Similar to the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal only published a handful of 
articles that could be considered critical of Fethullah Gulen or the Gulen movement until 2016. 
For example, a Turkish scholar, Soner Cagaptay’s article in 2010 entitled “Turkey’s Republic of 
Fear” referred to the Gulen movement as “ultra-conservative Fethullah Gulen Movement.”373 Jay 
Solomon also approached the movement with some suspicion in his 2016 article where he stated 
that “Mr. Gulen, in the past, hasn't made secret his hope that his supporters, who promote Turkish 
nationalism and Islamic values, would gradually dominate the ranks of the country's 
bureaucracy.”374  
The articles above demonstrate the positive portrayal of the Gulen movement and 
Fethullah Gulen by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. While the New York Times 
was outspoken about the alleged corruption in Gulen affiliated schools, the Wall Street Journal 
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chose to mostly ignore to report on the charter schools issue. The articles that did not criticize 
Gulen or the Gulen movement referred to Gulen mostly as an “imam,” “preacher,” or a “cleric,” 
without pointing out the controversies surround Gulen and his movement in their home country. 
These articles also dismissed the Turkish concerns as if they were coming from some radical 
faction and referred to the critics of Gulen as “seculars,” “secular hard-liners,” or indicated their 
support of military while pointing out the military enacted coups in order to protect the secular 
identity of the country. The handful of critical articles also did not point out the problems with 
Gulen’s ideology, never pointed out his support of violence against women, his hostility towards 
the LGBTQ+ communities, his disregard of modern science, and his lack of tolerance towards 
atheists. The reluctance of journalists to point out these characteristics of Gulen’s ideology could 
be explained by many reasons but I argue that there are two main reasons behind this false-
portrayal: 1) the absolute favoritism of Gulen and the Gulen movement by the American 
academia and 2) the still persistent Orientalism in the New York Times and in the Wall Street 
Journal. Since Orientalism sees the Orient as hesitant to change, monolithic, and perceives it and 
its peoples as backward and uncivilized, arguing for Gulen and the Gulen movement’s 
progressiveness indicate the overgeneralized backwardness of the Muslims in the Western eyes. 
When extremely conservative schools of Islam, such as Wahhabism, considered the ideology of 
Gulen can be easily seen as moderate or even progressive. After all, Gulen advocates a relative 
betterment of women’s status and absolute lack of violence to non-Muslims.375 In Wahhabism, 
on the other hand,  the use of violence for jihad is sometimes justified and the exclusion of 
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women from social and economic activity is widespread.376 When compared to Wahhabism, the 
Gulen movement is progressive and moderate, however, arguing that the Gulen movement is 
progressive and moderate without comparing it to a stricter ideology reveals the assumption of 
monolithic Islam. Modern Turkey, founded in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, allowed women 
to go to schools along with male pupils in 1924, banned polygyny and allowed divorce for 
women with the new Turkish Civil Law in 1926. Finally, in 1934 the Turkish women gained full 
suffrage.377 The first modern Turkish constitution from 1924 stated that every Turk was equal in 
front of the law and stated that it was mandatory for both genders to have the primary 
education.378 The new constitution of 1961 expanded the equality claim and stated that every 
citizen of Turkey was equal in front of the law regardless of their race, gender, and religion.379 
The same constitution also declared women and children as the ones to be protected by the 
state.380 In 1998, domestic violence was officially outlawed by the Turkish state.381 In short, it is 
evident that while Gulen’s ideology could be considered moderate for another Muslim majority 
country, it cannot be considered moderate or progressive in the case of Turkey, Gulen’s home 
country. Since Gulen advocated domestic violence and violence against women, it would be fair 
to say that his teachings are regressive for the Muslim majority Republic of Turkey. Therefore, I 
argue that portraying Gulen as a moderate and progressive cleric and the Gulen movement as a 
moderate and progressive movement are Orientalist because it clearly indicates the monolithic 
                                               
376 Christopher M. Blanchard, “The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya,” CRS Report for Congress, last 
modified January 17, 2007, accessed September 12, 2018,  http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a463789.pdf.; 
Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (Oneonta, NY: Islamic Publications International, 2002).  
377 Belkis Konan, “Turk Kadininin Siyasi Haklari Kazanma Sureci / The Process Where Turkish Women Earned 
Political Rights,” AUHFD 60 no:1 (2011): 167, 168, accessed September 12, 2018, 
http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/38/1584/17173.pdf.  
378 Ali Kuyaksil, “Türk Anayasalarında Kadın Hakları ve Gelişimi,” Mustafa Kemal Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler 
Enstitüsü Dergisi 6, no: 11 (2009): 343, http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/183154.   
379 Ibid, 345. 
380 Ibid. 







perception of Islam, overgeneralizing of Muslims into a single stereotype where women are 
disfranchised and often victimized by patriarchy, and also the perception of Muslim’s reluctance 
to change since many Muslims and Muslim societies have already progressed beyond Gulen’s 
ideology. The next chapter will explain the American academia’s approach and portrayal of 
Gulen and the Gulen movement and demonstrate why both the New York Times and the Wall 
Street Journal journalists were wrong to portray Gulen and the Gulen movement as moderate and 








CHAPTER II: MISREPRESENTATION OF FETHULLAH GULEN AND THE GULEN 
MOVEMENT BY THE ACADEMIA  
This chapter negates the US scholars’ and journalists’ portrayal of Fethullah Gulen and 
the Gulen movement and argues that the Gulen movement is essentially highly political, where 
Gulen ties religion to national identity and civilization, aims to impose a sexist ideology that 
conforms traditional gender roles and imprisons women to domestic sphere in addition to 
imposing outdated and factually wrong scientific knowledge to the public to further strengthen 
the religious identity. Gulen’s objective was defined as Turkifying Islam, and Islamizing the 
Turkish national identity; re-establishing the Ottoman idea of linking religion and state together 
where the rulers follow Islamic rules in their private lives to strengthen the state and protect the 
society.382 
The Gulen movement has attracted almost only positive reactions both by the news 
media and by American academics. Neither Fethullah Gulen, the Gulen movement, or a person 
who identifies as a Gulenist were criticized for supporting actions or ideas that directly contradict 
the clauses of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Except for Soner Cagaptay’s article 
that was published in the New York Times in 2010, neither the New York Times or the Wall Street 
Journal mentioned Gulen’s ideology that would inevitably cause human rights abuses in the 
countries or societies where it is employed. The most obvious reason behind this lack of criticism 
is the academics’ absolute favoritism of the Gulen movement even though there is contradictory 
evidence, easily available, to debunk their arguments. Journalists, who often consult academics’ 
ideas to comprehend foreign entities, such as the Gulen movement, end up being reluctant to 
point out or be completely unaware of the problems associated with these entities. A journalist 
                                               







would be completely comfortable calling Gulen “a moderate cleric” or portray him as someone 
who supports gender equality because, except for few exceptions, that was exactly what the 
academic works were saying about Gulen. Journalists’ hesitancy to challenge the established 
academic consensus is understandable since journalists do not always possess the same 
comprehension of the field or the region as the expert academics.   
Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement portrayed themselves as religious in private 
life but a politically secular movement that can exist within the democratic and secular state of 
Turkey. Their portrayal included being an apolitical entity that promotes gender equality, modern 
scientific knowledge that can co-exist with Islam, and inter-religious dialogue. Their approach to 
women’s rights, emphasis on modern education, where they teach Islam and science are 
supplementary to each other, and their work towards interreligious dialogue and promotion of 
toleration attracted much attention in the Western academic world.  
 One of the earliest scholarly works regarding the Gulen movement was a series of 
works published under the name Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement in 
2003, edited by Hakan M. Yavuz, a political scientist at the University of Utah, and John L. 
Esposito. Yavuz is a prominent scholar, who produced a considerable amount of work on the 
movement, recently started to criticize the movement and its political and anti-secular nature 
according to his interview with the daily newspaper Hurriyet.383 In Turkish Islam and the Secular 
State: The Gulen Movement secularism in Turkey was defined as “an intellectual and political 
project in Turkey has a long history of differentiating marginalizing and excluding large sectors 
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of Turkish society.”384 The authors accused the Young Turks and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk for 
depending on science and technology for economic development and trying to shape the society 
based on positivist philosophy.385 The book consisted of twelve works that dealt directly with 
Gulen and his ideology and the overall theme was the progressive nature of the movement. 
Despite the contradictory evidence given by authors regarding gender inequality and political 
nature of the movement Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gulen Movement portrayed the 
Gulen movement as a reformed future for Islam.  
The perception of the Gulen movement mostly positive in the US –aside from the 
alleged corrupt visa practices– despite some critical views of the movement in Turkey and around 
Europe. Martin Riexinger, from the Aarhus University in Denmark, criticized the movement for 
replacing the Kemalist “suppression” of the religious life in modern Turkey with American 
fundamentalism.386 The director of the Turkish Media Project at the Middle East Media 
Research Institute, Rachel Sharon-Krespin, was highly critical of the movement’s self-portrayal 
as a progressive and apolitical movement and pointed out the political objectives employed by 
the Gulen movement.387 Sharon-Krespin stated that “It appears Gulen is not fighting for more 
individual freedoms but to free Islam from the confines of the mosque and the private domain of 
individuals and to bring it to the public arena, to govern every aspect of life in the country.”388 
Criticism originated in Turkey targeted the movement’s claimed that the movement did not 
support gender equality and women’s rights.389  
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Wilson Center scholar Bulent Aras praised the Movement’s approach to women’s rights 
and gender equality. Aras classified Gulen’s views of women as progressive because Gulen’s 
arguments decreased the importance of the veil.390 According to Gulen women can hold high 
positions when they work outside of their homes and no one should be judged based on how they 
dressed.391 Dr. Sophia Pandya, who holds a Ph.D. in Religious Studies, recognized that the 
movement's events in the U.S. becoming less gender segregated and that there was some 
progression; male followers who live in the U.S. became more accustomed to the American 
culture and as a result, started to help their wives at home.392 Pandya stated that accusing the 
movement of patriarchy would eliminate the role taken by women in the movement.393 
Bernadette Andrea was another scholar who praised Fethullah Gulen’s views of women and 
stated that he was a “champion of women’s rights.”394 Aras, Pandya, and Andrea all seem to 
agree that Gulen was a feminist based on his argument of the non-essential nature of the 
veil/headscarf and his views on working women, who, according to Gulen, can hold high 
positions.  
Hakan M. Yavuz also agreed that Fethullah Gulen himself was progressive regarding 
gender roles and women’s rights, based on his views on the veil and working women, but his 
views were facing resistance within the movement since the members held more conservative 
views.395 Mark Webb agreed with Yavuz regarding the resistance and argued that even though 
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Gulen never voiced any opinions for gender segregation, the Gulen schools segregate students 
and teachers [both Muslim and non-Muslim] based on gender.396 Maria Curtis attributed this 
“slow progression” towards gender equality to the fact that many Gulenists came from traditional 
Turkish families.397  
 Fethullah Gulen and the Movement’s views on LGBTQ+ rights had not attracted much 
attention by the scholars, mainly due to the fact that neither Gulen nor the movement had been 
outspoken about this issue. However, Webb stated that it was impossible for a committed 
member to be openly gay, and claimed that the lack of voiced opinion by Gulen on the LGBTQ+ 
rights was a vulnerability for the movement.398 While most of the movement’s supporters in the 
West were theologically and socially liberal, Turkish Gulenists tended to be conservatives. He 
argued that this rift along with women’s rights issues may hurt the interreligious dialogue the 
movement was trying to achieve.399 
The Gulen movement had also been praised by scholars for promoting Turkish language 
and culture, promoting a message of peace and tolerance, and providing teachers who were 
positive role models to pupils while offering high-quality STEM-oriented education. Fuller 
explained the movement’s emphasis on peace and tolerance with their rationalism: “[The Gulen 
movement] is rationalist in its views and places great emphasis on tolerance toward all other 
religious (and even non-religious) views within a pluralist society that express the multi-faceted 
panoply of God’s creation.”400  
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 Elisabeth Ozdalga stated that Gulen schools did not teach Islam but “They introduce 
ethics through the exemplary conduct of their teachers.” According to Ozdalga, helping students 
to “internalize qualities of self-discipline, self-sacrifice, and tolerance” are among the duties of 
the teachers.401 Hakan M. Yavuz investigated Gulen’s use of educational networks to spread 
Islamic values. He stated that Gulen “Schools seek to consolidate conservative Islamic and 
Turkish values.” The footnote explained this sentence further, “Women can be either teachers or 
secretaries in these schools, and there are no women teachers in boys’ schools. Moreover, 
students are taught to respect authority.”402 Yavuz stated that the movement emphasizes the idea 
that modern science was compatible with Islam and that being a good citizen is related to being 
pious.403  
 Graham E. Fuller, who was a political analyst specializing in Islamic extremism who 
served as the former chairman of the National Intelligence Council in the Central Intelligence 
Agency, stated that the Gulen movement believed that science and Islam could co-exist, and that 
modern education and knowledge serve “to reveal God's presence and grand purpose in the 
universe the movement strives to create a higher level of moral consciousness in society thus 
leading over time to more enlightened governance.”404 The Movement’s strong emphasis on 
offering “good quality secular education” was explained by the movement’s perception of 
education which was seen as a way to get closer to God, by Fuller.405 Unlike Yavuz, Fuller did 
not recognize the issues with gender segregation in Gulen schools and considered them as secular 
institutions. Fuller, similarly to Yavuz, portrayed the movement as an apolitical and progressive 
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movement that emphasized education in his book The Future of Political Islam published in 
2003.406 Fuller also mentioned the movement’s tolerant attitude toward other religions and to the 
non-religious.407 Fuller’s view was also shared by Bulent Aras. Aras argued that the movement 
was against Political Islam and had no political interests.408 Sociologist Helen Rose Fuchs 
Ebaugh agreed with Fuller on the Gulen movement’s moderate nature and its dedication to 
interfaith dialogue and educating the youth.409  
The scholars explained the criticism of Gulen and the Movement in Turkey with the 
authoritarian nature of the secular Turkish regime. In Turkish Islam and the Secular State the 
authoritarian regime was criticized by Esposito: “[…] as the Mustafa Kemal saying went 
‘Science is the truest guide in life.’ So, the Kemalist laicism is not about the separation of politics 
and religion, but rather about restructuring society in accordance with positivist philosophy. In 
practice, this restructuring means preventing religious influence in the spheres of education, 
economics, family, dress code, and politics.”410  
The perception of the movement as a progressive future for Islam was explained by 
Bulent Aras in “Turkish Islam’s Moderate Face:” 
[Gulen] looks at the Islamic regulations bearing directly on government (such as taxation 
and warfare) in light of contemporary realities. This leads him to the conclusion […] that 
the democratic form of government is the best choice […] [Gulen says that] "no one can 
suppress the progress of women through the clothes they have to wear." Furthermore, he 
says, "women can become administrators," contradicting the views of most Islamic 
intellectuals. Gulen emphasizes worldly education and favors integration with the modern 
world. Gulen wishes to merge Islam into the international political system and the 
economy; he supports Turkey's bid for membership to the European Union […].411 
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As it could be understood from the quotation above, Gulen was praised for his non-extremist 
interpretation (ijtihad) of Islam, where he offered relative freedom to women and a space for 
functioning market economy along with a democratic state that aligned with Islamic ideals while 
advocating for non-violence and tolerance.412 Gulen emphasized that religion was a matter of 
private life and should not be politicized. Graham E. Fuller interpreted the progressiveness of the 
movement as: 
[The Gulen] movement […] dedicates the bulk of the movement’s energies to an 
educational effort, including the founding of schools and study circles to propagate a 
modernist approach to Islam based on broad moral teachings that are nearly universalist in 
character. The focus on study reflects the movement’s belief that education and 
knowledge in all fields, including science and technology, can never contradict religion 
but only serve to reveal God’s presence and grand purpose in the universe. […] 
[Gulenists] describe even the law of gravity, for example, as one of the elements of 
Shari’a. […]The movement does not engage in political activity, has no party, and 
believes that any legal government must be accorded respect.413 
 
 International Affairs and Islamic Studies scholar John L. Esposito is a known supporter of 
the movement along with Fuller. John L. Esposito specifically stated that the Gulen movement 
was a progressive movement.414 Esposito’s positive perception of the movement could be 
explained by the relatively moderate nature of the ideology promoted by the Gulen movement. 
Esposito stated that “Gulen emphasizes the centrality of freedom of thought and expression [and] 
is open to other cultures.415 […] Gulen supports the full separation of religion and the state and 
that he opposes religious parties.”416 Esposito also claimed that it was established that Gulen 
affiliated schools and universities taught modern sciences along with “a reformist understanding 
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of religion.”417 Esposito concluded his speech with a statement where he recognized Gulen as a 
reformist.418  
Hakan M. Yavuz, who held similar beliefs to Esposito about the movement, claimed that 
the Turkish secularism should be considered top-down modernization project and explained the 
bottom up-modernity as the following: 
With those two different conceptions of modernity, you have also two different 
conceptions of secularism in Turkey. One is the top-down modernization-project 
conception of secularism: it is very much a laïcisme in the French sense. This approach 
means that there is no room at all for religion in the public sphere, resulting in the 
cleansing of religion from the public domain. Science becomes the guide, while religion 
is something negative: something to get rid of. The second form of modernity – i.e. 
bottom-up modernity – allows room for religion in the public sphere. Its conception of 
secularism is in line with the Anglo-Saxon notion of this concept. Religion is seen as a 
source of morality and ethics. It also does not see religion and politics as being 
necessarily in conflict. However, it does not want religion to become a tool of politics, 
because if something then goes wrong in politics, people will blame religion.419 
 
Yavuz argued that Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement supported the latter, the bottom-up 
modernity. Supporters of Gulen agreed that Gulen favored a form of Islam that could easily 
function with a free market economy and a democratic state.  
Academics in the U.S. portrayed the Gulen movement as an apolitical movement that was 
secular in nature. Academics pointed out that Fethullah Gulen was a religious leader and the 
movement was based on Islamic principles but they had no interest in influencing the political 
sphere or reverse the secular achievements of the Turkish Republic. Their ideology allowed them 
to co-exist with a secular government while staying away from politics. For instance, Graham E. 
Fuller penned a recent article that was published in the Huffington Post after the latest coup-
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attempt in Turkey during the summer of 2016. Fuller explained the difference between Erdogan 
and Gulen by emphasizing the apolitical nature of the movement.  
But there are important differences between the two groups. Erdogan runs a political party 
while Gulen operates a civil movement called Hizmet (“Service”). Erdogan comes out of 
a more traditional Sunni Turkish Islamist movement; Gulen comes out of an apolitical, 
more Sufi, mystical and social tradition. Gulen is interested in slow and deep social 
change, including secular higher education; Erdogan as a party leader is first and foremost 
interested in preserving his party’s power, operating in a populist manner, trying to raise 
the general welfare.420 
 
In 1999 Siyaset Meydani, a popular political talk show broadcasted a leaked 
footage of Gulen speaking to his followers. In this footage, Gulen was seen as instructing how to 
infiltrate the state institutions to his followers and emphasizing how important it was to comply 
with the law and lay low until they infiltrated the law enforcement and the judicial system.  
Gulen’s involvement in politics was not denied by many, Hakan M. Yavuz openly 
mentioned his involvement with the new post-Coup Turkish identity known as the Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis that originated after the Coup of 1980. Yavuz stated that Gulen worked with 
Turgut Ozal during this time.421 In Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: 
The Gülen Movement, written in 2013, Yavuz aimed to demonstrate the statist nature of 
the Gulen movement. Yavuz stated that the movement emphasized the modern science was 
compatible with Islam and “That individuals must be pious in order to be good citizens.”422 
There were, however, conflicted perceptions of Gulen’s political involvement. He had 
been vocal about the much-debated presidential system. In 1997, Gulen stated that the 
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groundwork should be laid out for the presidential system and that the people should be gradually 
prepared for the system change.423 When questioned about Gulen’s involvement in politics, 
Gulenists explained the situation by stating that it was Gulen’s natural right as a Turkish citizen 
to voice his opinions on political matters. In addition to his natural right, his supporters added 
that Gulen aimed to construct a common morality regarding public places as a modern religious 
person.424  
Gulen’s political objectives explained as the following in a pro-Gulen article, 
“[Gulen] hopes to reestablish the link between religion and state that existed in the Ottoman era, 
thereby reversing one of the most clear-cut features of the state established by Atatürk.”425 Fuller 
also explained the controversy surrounding the movement in Turkey with Kemalist paranoia:  
While such a movement should be viewed as an ideal model of modern 
Islam, enlightened Muslim thinking, and a non-confrontational approach to politics and 
the state, it is in fact the source of much controversy inside the Kemalist state that fear its 
long range potential to bring back Islam into the hearts of Turkish citizenry in ways that 
might affect the state-controlled secularism of the state.426 
 
In Kucuk Dunyam, a book published in 1995 that essentially was a long interview with 
Gulen conducted by one of his followers, Gulen recounted events that indicated his politically 
active stance. “Hizmet (Gulen movement) participants have never formed a political party nor 
have they pursued political ambitions,” explained Fethullah Gulen in an Op-Ed he wrote for the 
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New York Times contrary to the evidence that himself provided only twenty years ago.427 In 
Kucuk Dunyam, Gulen said that he never accepted the coup of 1960; even though he was distant 
to political parties he favored the Democrat Party because of their relatively softer approach to 
Islamic services.428 In the same interview, he recounted a memory where he wanted to establish a 
foundation against Communism in Erzurum but did not have the chance to do so.429 Gulen later 
played an imported role in the state-sanctioned anti-Communism movement.430 Gulen recounted 
another memory where he planned to talk about Deccal (Al-Masih ad-Dajjal, simply the anti-
Christ) at the mosque on the last day of Ramadan, and he claimed that the mosque turned into a 
“meeting” place; the word “miting,” literally meeting, in Turkish is only used for political 
gatherings.431 
Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen movement had also been portrayed as progressive in 
women’s rights by the American academia. Gulen’s relatively relaxed stance on headscarf [he 
states that it was not mandatory to wear the headscarf, a pious woman could uncover her hair if 
the circumstances arise, referring to the headscarf ban in public institutions such as schools and 
universities that was in place before the Justice and Development Party lifted the ban in 2007 for 
universities, and completely in 2013] was simply enough for many of the academics to believe 
that Gulen and Gulenists deeply cared for the inclusion of women in public life and their equality 
to men.432 The Gulen Movement’s perception as a progressive movement was prominent among 
Western politicians in addition to scholars. The former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright was 
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a keynote speaker at Gulen Institute Luncheon Forums in 2008, where Kofi Annan was also a 
speaker only two years after Albright.433 Albright stated that the world lacked a direction and 
needed a pathfinder. This role cannot be filled by “radicals, aggressive nationalists, autocrats, 
apostles of the holy war” but it may be filled by someone who shared Gulen Institute's values; 
which were "commitment to international dialogue and understanding of cultural diversity, 
support for human justice and the love of peace."434 Annan, in his 2010 
speech, promoted Gulen as a champion of 21st Century values such as “freedom, equality, 
solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and the environment, and the shared responsibility for 
humankind.”435 A recent article published on FoxNews.com, written by the Gulenist Rumi 
Foundation’s president, argued that Erdogan’s so-called witch-hunt in Turkey targeted 
the Gulenists because they were moderate Islamists and defined the movement as:  
The witch-hunt has targeted the coeducational, non-denominational schools, stressing 
math and science, which serve diverse populations across the world and in the US. In this 
battle between the strongman and the scholar, Americans should recognize Mr. Gulen as 
an advocate of human rights, religious freedom and world peace.436 
 
An article published on GulenMovement.us, written by Sait M. Yavuz, explained 
Gulen’s approach to gender equality by stating that he did not support “the ‘western champions 
of women’s rights,” and continued “in [Gulen’s] words ‘most champions of women’s rights and 
freedom only excite women with physical pleasure and then stab her spirit.’ Gulen thinks that for 
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the sake of so-called freedom, women were used as objects of pleasure, means of entertainment, 
and materials for advertisement, which reduced ‘freedom’ to sexual liberty.”437 Yavuz explained 
how Gulen saw equality among genders:  
Gulen thinks that there is no obstacle in front of women in having equal rights and 
responsibilities with men; however, women and men have been physically and 
emotionally different so that gender roles have had to suit these differences […] Men 
have been physically stronger and apt to bearing hardship, while women are more 
compassionate, delicate and self-sacrificing. Therefore, the responsibility of motherhood 
is given to women, so that they naturally become the first nurturers, educators, and 
trainers of the new generation. This makes women the first teachers of the humanity, 
which is a unique position bestowed upon them by God.438 
 
As it was clear in Yavuz’s article, Gulen had a traditionally conservative view of gender roles. 
While he explicitly stated that women could work for wages outside of their homes, however, the 
main duty of a woman was to serve; first to God and then to her family since the primary role of 
the woman is motherhood in Gulen’s eyes. 
Gulen was usually considered moderate because of his views of the Islamic headscarf. 
He argued that covering the hair was not a religious necessity for women and the education 
should be chosen over wearing the hijab. This was essential for the movement to gain more 
followers during the years where the headscarf and hijab were banned in public spaces in Turkey 
(such as schools, universities, military institutions etc.)439  
Aside from his relatively moderate views on the headscarf, Gulen’s actions and speeches have 
proven that he was promoting a sexist and a dangerous ideology, which threatens not only the 
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hopes for gender equality but also the established women’s and LGBTQ+ rights. An article, that 
did not appear on the same website’s English language version, entitled 
“Peygamber Efendimizin Kadınları Dövme Tavsiyesi Nasıl Değerlendirmelidir?” written by 
Gulen, advised men on how to beat their wives properly.440 In this article Gulen strongly 
defended men’s right to beat their wives by stating that after everything else failed to subdue a 
rebellious wife, “Who in their right mind would object the beating [as the last resort?]441 Any 
form of violence and domestic violence are illegal under the Turkish law and there is a specific 
law that aimed to protect women and children – or any person – who are victims and/or under the 
threat of domestic violence or stalking.442 Gulen, by publishing this article clearly encourages 
men to beat their wives, therefore to break the Turkish law.  
A conference, organized by the Journalists and Writers Foundation in 2010 on family –
an organization closely associated ties with Fethullah Gulen since he is the honorary president – 
hosted Allen C. Carlson as the keynote speaker. Carlson was the emeritus president of the 
Howard Center for Family, Religion & Society, a tax-exempt institution that works against 
women’s and LGBTQ+ rights.443 According to Carlson contraception and sexual intercourse, 
other than for reproduction, were great dangers for the future of the society.444 Carlson’s speech 
from another conference, given under the same title, defined the traditional family as the 
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marriage of man and woman, and argued that only the societies with traditional families could 
have prosperity. Carlson relied heavily on the Bible to prove his points.445 Overall, there is a clear 
inconsistency between Carlson’s views and the Gulen movement’s perceived “progressiveness.” 
However, since the same conference declared homosexuality as a disease that needed to be 
fought against and also classified homosexuality along with incest and urged religious marriages 
to be recognized [punishable with jail time according to the Turkish law when not accompanied 
with legal marriage] while arguing that measures should be taken to discourage abortion, 
Carlson’s and Gulenists’ views clearly align.446 
A Gulen affiliated internet source on Islam, the Way to Truth, claimed that “God’s 
Messenger” advised marrying childbearing women and preferring virginity. The source stated 
that a virgin woman was more likely to be pleased by a man and less likely to be devious and 
deceiving. The source noted that both parties should be virgins while indicating that women were 
prone to being devious and deceiving.447 The source stated that “a girl” [the word girl describes a 
virgin woman, regardless of her age] had a right to choose her spouse and her father or guardian 
cannot ignore her wishes.448 What was being said here was that women were under the 
guardianship of someone rather than being independent individuals. This was made clearer under 
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the section of Nikah, which means a marriage contract, where the source stated the following is 
required for Nikah to be valid: 
The presence of the woman’s guardian or representative (waliy). The waliy is a Muslim 
man charged with marrying a woman entrusted to his care to a man who will be good for 
her.449 
 
 The section Women to Whom Marriage is Prohibited was directed towards men, hence 
the indicated that men could choose their spouses but women could not.450 The same source 
argued that Muslim men cannot marry any woman who practices idolatry and could only marry a 
previously married woman if her husband died or divorced her. Again, the indication was that a 
woman could not control her own life and could simply be “divorced.”451 The source directly 
talked to women on one certain occasion where it forbid them from marrying any non-Muslim 
men, even if they were “People of the Book” [referring to Christians and Jews] while Muslim 
men were told that there was no limitation on marrying women from the same category.452 
The source touched upon the gender equality issues as well, and stated that the men and 
women were created equal but are not the same: 
 
This distinction between equality and sameness is vital. Equality is desirable, just, and 
fair; but sameness is not. People are created as equals, and not as identical to each other, 
and so there is no basis to consider a woman to be inferior to a man. There is no reason to 
assume that she is less important than he just because her rights are not identical to his. 
Had her status been identical with his, she would have been no more than a duplicate of 
him, which she is not. The fact that Islam gives her equal – but not identical – rights 
shows that it takes her into due consideration, acknowledges her, and recognizes her 
independent personality. […] However, we should acknowledge that a woman’s heart is 
the most compassionate, loving and generous of all hearts. This is why the Qur’an stresses 
men’s inclination toward and attachment to women, rather than the other way. In fact, it 
states that the most beautiful blessing in Paradise for a man will be a pure woman. […] 
God has not created all people exactly the same in all respects; rather, He has given each 
superiority in some respect to others, as required by social life, the division of labor, and 










the choice of occupation. Although it is not true to the same degree for all men and 
women, as He has created men superior to women in some respects, He also has given 
women superiority over men in others. For example, God has given men greater physical 
strength, endowed them with a greater capacity for management, and has charged them 
with the family’s financial upkeep. This is why He has made men the head of the family. 
However, this does not mean that men have absolute authority over the family, for this 
authority must be exercised according to the Prophetic principle: The master of a people 
is he who serves them. In addition, responsibility is proportionate to authority and 
authority is proportionate to responsibility.453 
 
When it came to polygyny the source stated that it was uncommon in Muslim societies but 
defended the practice with Billy Graham’s views:  
 
No one is unaware of the part mistresses play in Western society. In this respect Islam is a 
fundamentally honest religion, and permits a Muslim to marry a second wife if he must, 
but strictly forbids all clandestine amatory associations in order to safeguard the moral 
probity of the community.454 
 
Also, the unequal inheritance in Islamic law was explained by the women’s lesser earning 
capacity and since the husband took care of the wife, the source argued that men should inherit 
more.455 While this source may not reflect Gulen’s own views, the close association indicated 
that Gulen and Gulenists were not bothered by the content. 
Fethullah Gulen himself had written about how to raise female children in 1962. Since 
the article could be found on Gulen’s official website without any edits it is fair to assume that 
Gulen’s view on this matter had not changed since 1962. Gulen stated that if women would adopt 
men-like characteristics and men adopt women-like ones it would cause degeneration in the 
society. Girls should be raised lady-like and encouraged to perform lady-like duties like sewing. 
Gulen strongly emphasized that girls should not wear boys’ clothing. He stated that just like 
when men try to act and look like women, it was equally unsympathetic and ugly when women 









adopt men-like traits. He warned parents that if they let this happen the child will become 
“Something in between men and women, a third gender,” and women or men acting like the 
opposite gender were cursed.456 The Gulenist hostility to LGBTQ+ individuals was apparent in 
this article.  
 Gulen’s views on HIV, a disease that is known for destroying many LGBTQ+ 
communities, are controversial as well. As a leader who promoted “Freedom, equality, solidarity, 
tolerance, respect for nature and the environment, and the shared responsibility for humankind,” 
in Kofi Annan's’ words, Gulen stated that he was ashamed to talk about HIV and that Muslims 
were the least impacted community of the HIV crises because of their way of life. Even though, 
he argued, there were campaigns for Muslims to renounce that way of life in an article entitled 
“Is It Right When People Link HIV to “The Beast of the Earth” (Dabbat al-ard), One of the Signs 
of the Last Day?” In this article, Gulen argued that HIV and AIDS were just two of the impurities 
the “modern lifestyle” brought.457 
Gulen explained in Kucuk Dunyam that when the judge asked him about his previous 
remarks regarding women during a trial, he explained that he sometimes preached to women and 
he stopped shaving a while before these sermons and always appeared with a beard before 
women. Gulen said that he warned women to look in front of them rather than looking at his face 
when he was preaching and classified his behavior as something that was in favor of religion 
despite the court tried to use it against him.458 Another issue the Turkish court took with Gulen, 
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according to Gulen himself, was his words on the contemporary youth. He warned the 
congregation of young people for almost making love on mosque windows and drinking next to 
mosque walls. Gulen explained that he was asked if he said: “If these people would not be 
schooled based on Islamic ideals they would drink wine from their fathers’ skulls.” He accepted 
the quote and stated that he did not see anything wrong with these statements and asked the 
reader if there was anything wrong with them.459  
Gulen repeatedly mentioned supernatural occurrences throughout the book; he seemed 
to be under the impression that a greater being was communicating with him through his 
dreams.460 He recounted that in order to buy flooring for a new Imam Hatip [Islamic equivalent 
of a seminary] that was under construction he had to talk to a woman, even though he did not 
want to. He stated that even if it was hard for him to talk to a woman he compromised on his 
principles for a greater good; strangely they did not buy anything from that woman, he added.461 
Gulen also explained that he only thought about getting married when he had too much dirty 
laundry.462 Furthermore, Gulen mentioned of two women at a local organization in Erzurum. He 
defined them by their lack of headscarves but added that these women perceived themselves as 
covered relative to how other women dressed since they at least wore long skirts.463 He stated 
that when his father came to visit him during his military service, he could not find a “clean” 
hotel for his father to stay. This was because every hotel accepted women as guests. He explained 
that this situation was against his understanding of decency. He further explained that he spoke in 
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favor of vandalism against these hotels and that one time he asked that the government controlled 
the law enforcement and if they did not intervene with this “immorality” then who would?464  
Gulen’s view of women does not fit his perception as a progressive Islamic scholar who 
supports women’s rights and modern education or to his perceived tolerant approach to different 
cultures and religions. His rhetorical question regarding the hotels that accepted women as 
customers indicated a clear political objective. Yet, Sophia Pandya in the introduction she has 
written for The Gulen Hizmet Movement and Its Transnational Activities: Case Studies of 
Altruistic Activism in Contemporary Islam, stated that accusing the movement of being 
patriarchal would eliminate the role taken by women in the movement.465 Gulen was being 
portrayed as a progressive religious leader while there was clear encouragement to not to 
question or criticize the blatant sexism of the movement.  
When compared to extreme Islamic movements, such as Wahhabism, Gulen’s 
interpretation of Islam employs a rather progressive outlook. However, since Gulen’s ideology 
originated in an essentially secular country it would not be logical to compare Gulen’s views to 
some of the more extreme interpretations of Islam originated in different nations. Gender-specific 
violence and discrimination based on gender, two ideas that are encouraged by Gulen were 
crimes according to the Turkish Civil Law that was in effect from 1926 to 2001 and still are 
according to the current Civil Law.466  
 Gulen was also praised for claiming that Islam and modern science must and should co-
exist. Graham Fuller explained that during the research period of his book, The Future of 
Political Islam, he “found Hizmet to be remarkably moderate, tolerant, non-violent, open to 
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dialogue, a social rather than political movement, and a strong proponent of education as the 
means to empower Muslims in a globalizing future. […] I still believe that Hizmet as a 
movement represents one of the most encouraging faces of contemporary Islam in the 
world.”467Again, in Kucuk Dunyam, Gulen explained how enraged he was when he heard about 
the possibility of the Quran published in Turkish with the Turkish alphabet. He stated that he 
perceived this event as a move against Islam.468 A relatively radical reaction by a person who 
claimed to favor modern education and encourage knowledge since a translated Quran meant 
easier access to it for the majority of the Turkish people who did not speak Arabic. When asked if 
he had any doubts about his beliefs Gulen recounted an event he had experienced when he was 
younger. During this time Gulen was reading a Turkish author’s novel [neither the author nor the 
novel’s name was given] where the author mentioned Darwinism [the theory of evolution] and 
the possibility of evolution influenced Gulen temporarily. Gulen explained that he “recovered” 
from this episode of doubtful anxiety where Satan was trying to impose these thoughts onto 
Gulen with the help of God.469 He also stated that if he had any power he would have had written 
about the inconsistencies in the theory of evolution. He stated that there should be serious works 
that explained and provided evidence for the creation. Anything that refutes creationism should 
not be tolerated, Gulen said; if there was a single person who stopped praying because of the 
influence of evolution that would be the worst trouble that he could imagine.470  
To avoid anti-religious influences, Gulen supports “proper brainwashing.”471 He said 
that the questioning of religion should not exist in the first place and that people should be 
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conditioned not to question. Belief, he said, was not conditioning, but conditioning should come 
after belief was established. Individuals must not let think of any of these beliefs that were 
against the religion and that every individual should be conditioned to think like this.472  
Fethullah Gulen strongly emphasizes creationism. “Kur’ân-ı Kerim’de ve Hadis-
i Şeriflerde Yaratılış” is an article written by Gulen, aimed to prove that creation was based on 
the Quran.473 Another source where Gulen’s hostility to modern science was apparent was an 
introduction written by him for a biology textbook entitled “Towards Alternative Biology.” The 
authors of the book vehemently argued against evolution.474 Gulen also answered a question 
regarding the first human beings in the Americas and explained how the first peoples got to the 
Americas, after mistakenly stating that the evolutionary argument claimed that people have had 
evolved in the Americas.475  
Gulen even wrote a book called the Creationism Reality and Evolution, where he tried to 
prove that creation was, in fact, factual while evolution was still a theory.476 In an interview 
conducted with Gulen for the daily newspaper Milliyet, Gulen stated that the military general 
Kenan Evren, who enacted the Coup of 1980 and held responsible for a series of executions of 
political prisoners, would eventually go to heaven despite his “sins” because he made religion 
classes mandatory for all school children. 477 These religion classes were not comprehensive 
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survey classes but they were designed to teach solely Sunni Islam to students and aimed to shape 
them to be obedient to the state.478  
Gulen’s promotion of evolution was not limited to his own writings. Sizinti was a 
magazine owned by the Gulen movement until it got shut down by  
the Turkish government following the coup attempt in 2016. The former vice-president of the 
Institute for Creation Research, Duane Gish’s article on creationism and evolution was published 
in Sizinti. Gish was a Young Earth creationist and had been to Turkey for more than one occasion 
to attend conferences on creationism. Gish, in this article, defended the need for teaching 
creationism because evolution was an outdated theory.479 
Gulen is a strong supporter of Abrahamic religions. He argued that any nation that did 
not have a belief was condemned to disappear.480 Religion was essential for a person’s well-
being, and even if the non-believer person was well educated there could be no possible way for 
this person to be beneficial [to the society].481 Gulen argued that being a non-believer brought 
many unfortunate symptoms such as bad luck.482 Gulen argued that non-believers would work to 
fulfill their endless desires, would go to hell before they die and eventually they would die 
alone.483 According to Gulen non-believers lost their interest in compassion and mercy. At this 
point in the article, Gulen quoted an uncited source that claimed that “no mercy” should be 
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shown to non-believers who were experiencing the drunkenness of denial, just like “no mercy” 
should be shown to people who were engaging in vandalism when they were drunk on wine.484 
Then he added that even if they were shown mercy, they would not accept it because their hearts 
would be closed.485 “No mercy” in this context can be interpreted as having violent connotations 
but it can also mean to ignore these individuals when trying to convert people to Islam. Gulen 
claimed that non-believers would be able to perform any kind of evil act and that it would be 
impossible to persuade them to believe in religion.486 Gulen argued that non-believers were 
harmful to the public order.487 
Gulen has had been recently accused of comparing atheists to terrorists for the following 
quote stating that "Those who kill a person will suffer the same fate as unbeliever."488 Gulen later 
retracted this statement and provided an explanation regarding the context.489 Gulen argued that 
atheism spreads because “Education is misused, young people are neglected, and schools actually 
defend and foster it.”490 According to Gulen God’s existence manifests itself in nature, and he 
added that “Planets and stars move within an interrelated complexity of drifts and orbits that are 
infinitely more precise than anything we could ever design or make. If what we make is accepted 
as evidence of intelligent design, why is the far more vast and complicated universe considered 
an exception to this rule?”491 Gulen blamed French existentialists and Western European 
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influence that valued individual freedom more than religious education and “less careful” 
scientists for the spread of atheism. Scientists were blamed for offering only theories than 
scientific truths and that public opinion tended to value these scientists rather than “more 
valuable ones.”492  
 
For example, many textbooks and encyclopedias continue to present humanity's 
evolution from apes to human beings as fact instead of theory. In reality, a 
growing number of scientists, most particularly evolutionists, argue that Darwin's 
theory of evolution is not a truly scientific theory at all. Many critics of the highest 
intellectual caliber admit that we still have no idea of how this "evolution" took 
place. While there is a great deal of divergent opinion among the experts about 
probable causes and the actual process, the general public and less-informed 
scientists continue to believe in it.493 
 
Gulen clearly stated that they (he uses the word we) should target the atheists whose beliefs were 
not firmly established and must teach them the truth.494 
Gulen thinks that it was humanity’s most important duty to “enlighten others with 
knowledge of the true religion and the duties that accompany it.”495 Gulen stated that everyone, 
regardless of their age and status, must tell other people “What he is supposed to tell.”496 Gulen 
advised to approach the subject by giving gifts, or helping them first, and become their friends 
before inviting them to faith. He advised that the person must be careful and considerate to not to 
scare the possible convert away from them and Islam. This was only possible by knowing 
possible convert’s “level of faith, knowledge and culture.”497 Gulen heavily emphasized the 
earning trust and friendship of possible convert to a degree where their friendship “weigh heavier 













than that of his other friends.”498 Gulen warned his followers to be careful during the time where 
many “Obstinate people have come to soften their attitudes to Islamic matters and even begun to 
consider them as feasible. Therefore, at such a time, it is incumbent upon us to develop, employ 
and evaluate new methods and approaches, provided that we do not depart from the essence and 
spirit of the truth.”499 
The evidence, that is easily accessible through a simple internet search, demonstrates 
that Gulen and the Gulen movement are in fact not moderate nor progressive. Gulen supports 
creationism over scientific consensus while arguing that he supports modern scientific education 
and that science and Islam must co-exist. As we see from his own writings, Gulen supports 
science only when it conforms to the Quran. Similar this his scientific views, Gulen is extremely 
anti-women and anti-LGBTQ+, to a point where not only he supports violence against women 
but he also sees women as sub-humans who are to be disciplined by men. In addition, Gulen is 
not tolerant in the sense that he tolerates other beliefs and lifestyles, he is just tolerant enough not 
to violently subdue the things he claimed to tolerate. Gulen sees non-Muslims as possible 
converts and instructs his followers how to successfully deceive these targeted people into 
conversion. It is, therefore, quite clear that the American academics were actually employing 
Orientalism when portraying Gulen as moderate and/or progressive. The academics, who favored 
Gulen absolutely set lower standards for a Muslim movement because they believed that Gulen’s 
ideology was progressive for all Muslims. Naturally, this sentiment carried on to create a public 
opinion in America since the New York Times and the Wall Street Journalists also employed the 
same approach, possibly in order to not to challenge the academia.  
 
  








CONCLUSION: THE FALSE REPRESENTATION OF THE GULEN MOVEMENT AS A 
RESULT OF PERSISTENT ORIENTALISM 
 
As this thesis demonstrates, despite the efforts to adopt a more neutral and balanced 
approach to cultures and societies that are not Western, the Orientalist approach persisted both in 
the academia and in journalism. Orientalism evolved to neo-Orientalism and even disguised itself 
as self-Orientalism.500 The otherness of Muslims and Muslim societies have had been 
emphasized by the news media in the United States. For this thesis, I examined the approaches of 
the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal to see if they employed differing approaches to 
Muslims and Islam. In order to have a clear demonstration, I chose the time-frame between 1985 
and 2016. The date 1985 was significant because it was a time where the Cold War was still 
relevant to the United States yet the growing radical Islam also started to pose a significant threat. 
Starting my research on Orientalism in the news media from 1985 also allowed me to examine 
the evolution of the approaches, or the lack of it, with rather significant events. The most 
important of these events was the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York 
City in 2001. Al-Qaeda, a radical Islamic terrorist organization, was behind this atrocity that cost 
more than two-thousand lives and eventually led the United States into a war in Afghanistan in 
2001. During this time, the media portrayal of women especially became important for the 
Americans, portraying Afghan women as in need of Western rescue grew prominence according 
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to experts. In addition to the war in Afghanistan, the Iraq War of 2003 was also sometimes 
justified on the grounds of liberating Muslim women from their Muslim male captors. The 
original research question for this thesis was “Why does the media portray the Gulen movement 
positively?” but as I broaden my scale and focused on the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the 
media, and specifically in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal the distorted view and 
the otherness of Muslims became apparent.  
The reason why I decided to focus on the New York Times and Wall Street Journal was 
to be able to see if there were any differences between the two newspapers that are known to 
represent and serve to differing ends of the political spectrum. The New York Times, the 
newspaper of record, one of the most trusted newspapers in the world, usually identified as a 
liberal-leaning newspaper. The majority of its readers also identify as liberals rather than 
conservatives. While the Wall Street Journal is the opposite, being almost equally large by 
circulation and trusted source of news usually classified as a conservative-leaning medium. 
Because of this clear difference between the newspapers, it was surprising to discover that both 
of them employed an almost identical approach to Muslims, Muslim societies, and Islam. The 
existing research on the portrayal of Muslims and Islam in the news media supported these 
findings. Especially since the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and with the rise of Taliban, the 
portrayal of Muslims and Islam became synonymous with the other, uncivilized, barbarous, 
dangerous, and irrational; and in the case of Muslim women in need of Western help. Edward 
Said’s definition of Orientalism consisted mainly four different characteristics; the otherness of 
Muslims and Islam, the homogeneousness of Islam, Islam and Muslim’s resistance to change, 
and the overgeneralization of the Orient as a whole. The news articles I examined for this thesis, 
except for a handful of nuanced and neutral articles, employed all four of these characteristics.  






employed by the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, I examined the same newspapers’ 
portrayal of the Gulen movement in order to have a clear understanding of their approach to 
Gulen and the Gulen movement. After the examination of the New York Times and the Wall 
Street Journal for articles related to the Gulen movement, the evidence revealed that only the 
New York Times reported extensively on the corruption allegations regarding Gulen affiliated 
charter schools in the United States. The evidence also demonstrated that both of these 
newspapers positively portrayed the Gulen movement and Fethullah Gulen himself. While it is 
important to note that both newspapers published critical articles of the movement and Gulen, 
most of the articles were completely ignored the controversies surround Gulen and the 
movement. It was also revealed after examining the articles that, even the journalists who 
employed critical approaches to the Gulen movement avoided providing an in-depth criticism of 
Gulen’s ideology. As demonstrated in the second chapter of this thesis, the Gulen movement is a 
highly political, non-secular movement that supports gender inequality and theories that are 
considered unscientific by the consensus. While most journalists in both of these sources referred 
to Gulen simply as a cleric, or an imam, their articles lacked any proper information regarding 
Gulen’s ideology. The sympathetic articles defined Gulen’s ideology as “moderate” and even 
argued that Gulenists and Gulen believe tolerance and the compatibility of science and religion. 
While Gulen’s ideology could be considered moderate for some Muslims, not all Muslims would 
consider Gulen progressive or moderate. The Turkish critics of Gulen, usually consisted of 
people from the Turkish Armed Forces according to these articles, were dismissed as “seculars,” 
and their concerns were oversimplified as radical views. While some of the articles pointed out 
that Gulen was tried for trying to establish an Islamic state and provided the leaked footage of 
Gulen where he was instructing his followers to infiltrate the state institutions, these articles 






state such as advising violence against women. I argued that the positive portrayal of Gulen that 
disregarded his non-moderate and non-progressive ideology stemmed from the Orientalist 
approach. The journalists’ approach was essentially Orientalist since almost all of them argued 
that Gulen was moderate while not defining what moderate was, and moderate in relation to what 
or who. In short, Orientalism was persistent in the New York Times and in the Wall Street Journal 
and because of this the Gulen movement and Fethullah Gulen have had been portrayed 
inaccurately.  
Another reason for journalists to portray Gulen and the Gulen movement in a certain 
way was the perception of Gulen by the academia. While Gulen has had been criticized by some 
European and Turkish scholars, there was an absolute favoritism of Gulen in the American 
academia. The latest section of my thesis demonstrates why Gulen cannot be considered 
moderate or progressive. While both Gulen and Gulenists misrepresented their ideology by 
giving false statements about their beliefs, I argue that since almost all the information I accessed 
when I was writing this thesis was available online and could be reached with a simple Google 
search, it was also Orientalism that led the scholars to think that Gulen was moderate. As I 
mentioned above, some of Gulen’s beliefs could be considered moderate and even progressive in 
comparison to some more conservative and/or radical interpretations of Islam. It is, however, 
impossible to classify Gulen moderate or progressive in general since there are more moderate 
and progressive Muslims than Gulen. Not all Muslims condone violence against women, hate 
atheists, and the LGBTQ+ communities while believing that the theory of evolution is an 
imperialistic tool of the West. In fact, in Turkey, where the Gulen movement originated, 
evolution has been a part of national education curricula until very recently, while discrimination 
based on religion has been outlawed since the 1920s. Violence against women is an issue the 






since 1998.  
The answer to my original question “Why does the media portray the Gulen movement 
positively?” is that because of their Orientalist approach, the journalists overgeneralize all 
Muslims as less moderate and less progressive than Fethullah Gulen’s ideology and falsely 
portray him as the bright future of Islam. This approach is problematic for two distinct reasons. 
First of all, it shows that Orientalism is still persistent well into the year 2016. And second of all, 
while referring to Gulen as moderate and progressive these journalists falsely represent all 
Muslims in a negative light. All the issues that Gulen’s ideology has, violence, hatred of women 
and the LGBTQ+, scientific backwardness are already associated with Islam as a result of Islam’s 
Orientalist portrayal. Presenting Gulen as moderate for saying that violent Jihad should not be 
waged diminishes the value of actual moderate and progressive Muslims. This portrayal of Gulen 
also indicates that even the moderate Muslims condones violence against woman and is hateful 
towards certain groups. Which is simply not accurate. Portraying Gulen’s ideology as positive, 
these journalists and academics, contributed to the stereotypes of Muslims, Islam and further 
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